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Philosophy

Adam Dyrda

Research interests

Neopragmatism, epistemology, ethics of belief, general jurisprudence, legal realism

Current research

I completed my PhD on the conventionality thesis in contemporary legal positivism at Jagiellonian University (Cracow, Poland) in 2012. In 2018 I obtained a degree of doctor habilitatus on the basis of the monograph on metaphilosophical underpinnings of theoretical disagreements in jurisprudence. I am an assistant professor in the Department of Legal Theory, Jagiellonian University.

Thanks to generous support of the Polish National Agency of Academic Exchange (NAWA) and hospitality of the University of Manchester I am currently (February-June 2019) realizing the project entitled “Towards the Reunion in Philosophy: Holistic Pragmatism and Its Pragmatic Alternatives”. The project concerns the account of “holistic pragmatism” developed Morton G. White (1917-2016). White’s holistic pragmatism is generally rooted in a Quinean mode of thinking, and as such it rejects all artificial dichotomies, including the analytic-synthetic distinction. Nonetheless, it is more inclusive than Quine’s, since it argues for the inclusion of various types of normative judgments (especially ones from the ethical and epistemological) into the Quinean “web of belief”. It explicitly denies Quine’s motto that “philosophy of science is philosophy enough” and argues that at least some normative judgments can have an empirical foothold.  

During the project, I am willing to compare White’s metaphilosophical ideas with ideas of other leading pragmatists with respect to their assumed ability to unite all philosophical disciplines. I am especially interested in differences that pertain to the pragmatist understanding of the philosophical method and its limitations. White himself suggested that a consistent pragmatism is “methodologically monistic”. As such it has a unifying force, for monism assumes that there are no fundamental divisions between different philosophical disciplines (the only differences that exist are differences in degree, not in kind). Pragmatism, after all, seems to be a profoundly “democratic” philosophy, where every domain of human thought can find its place. I hope that my research at UoM would eventually result in the critical positioning of White’s holistic pragmatism on the horizon of contemporary analytic and pragmatist ideas.

Publications

Books

  • 2017, Sporyteoretycznewprawoznawstwie. Perspektywaholistycznegopragmatyzmu [“Theoretical Disagreements in Jurisprudence. The Perspective of Holistic Pragmatism”], Scholar, Warszawa, 512 pages.
  • with T. Gizbert-Studnicki and A. Grabowski, 2016, Metodologicznedychotomie: krytykapozytywistycznychteoriiprawa [“Methodological Dychotomies: The Critique of Positivistic Theories of Law”], Wolters Kluwer, Warszawa, 479 pages.
  • 2013, Konwencja u podstaw prawa. Kontrowersje pozytywizmu prawniczego [“Convention at the Foundations of Law. Controversies over Legal Positivism”], Wolters Kluwer, Warszawa, 472 pages.

Co-edited books

  • with P. Banaś and T. Gizbert-Studnicki (eds), 2016, Metaphilosophy of Law, Bloomsbury: Hart Publishing, Oxford, Portland and Oregon, 272 pages.

Articles and chapters

  • with T. Gizbert-Studnicki, Do Legal Concepts Travel? [in:] "Language and Legal Interpretation in International Law," Oxford Studies in Language and Law, J. Jemielniak, A. L. Kjaer (eds), Oxford University Press, 2019 [forthcoming].
  • Truisms, Heuristics and the Concept of Law, "Principia," 65/2018
  • with M. Dubowska, Legal Narrative and Legal Disagreement, “Archiwum Filozofii Prawa i Filozofii Społecznej,” no 2/2018
  • The Real Ratio Legis and Where to Find It. Few Pragmatic Considerations [in:] V. Klappstein, M. Dybowski (eds), Ratio Legis. Philosophical and Theoretical Perspectives, Springer, Cham 2018, pp. 3-17.
  • Realizm prawniczy a pozytywizm prawniczy [Legal Realism and Legal Positivism] “Avant,” vol. IX, no 1/2018, pp. 47-66. .
  • with M. Dubowska, polish translation of W.K. Clifford’s famous essay „The Ethics of Belief” (1877), "ER(R)GO Teoria–Literatura–Kultura," no 35/2017, pp. 169-190.
  • The Epistemology of Theoretical Disagreement[in:] P. Banaś, A. Dyrda, T. Gizbert-Studnicki (eds), Metaphilosophy of Law, Bloomsbury: Hart Publishing, Oxford, Portland and Oregon, pp. 227-260.
  • Pragmatism, Holismand the Concept of Law, „Erasmus Law Review,” no. 1/2015, pp. 2-13.
  • Are fundamental legal reasons internal?: few remarks on the Hartian idea of the internal point of view [in:] M. Araszkiewicz, P. Banaś, T. Gizbert-Studnicki, K. Płeszka (red.), Problems of normativity, rules and rule-following, Springer, “Law and Philosophy Library 111,” Cham 2015, pp. 229-239
  • Why Legal Conventionalism Fails?, “Archiwum Filozofii Prawa i Filozofii Społecznej,” no 1(10)/2015, pp. 14-30. 
  • Do arguments help (in face of peer legal disagreement)?: plea for an epistemic theory [in:] M. Skop et. al. (eds), Argumentation 2015: International Conference on Alternative Methods of Argumentation in Law (Proceedings), Brno 2015, Czech Republic, pp. 1-25.
  • with T. Gizbert-Studnicki, Over-aggregated concepts, adjective-modifiers and argumentation [in:] M. Skop et. al. (eds), Argumentation 2013: international conference on alternative methods of argumentation in law (Proceedings), Acta Universitatis Brunensis, Brno 2013, pp. 23-40.
  • with W. Ciszewski, Remediumwobecdiagnozy, czylijakliberalizmpolitycznyodpowiadanafaktniezgody [Remedy vs. Diagnosis. How Political Liberalism Accounts for Political Disagreement], Diametros: Internetowe Czasopismo Filozoficzne” [Diametros: An Online Journal of Philosophy”] no 37/2013,, pp. 13-33.
  • with W. Ciszewski, In Search for the Rational Response: Assessing the Rawlsian Foreground for Resolving Political and Legal Disagreements, [in:] J. Savelka, et al. (eds), Argumentation 2012, Acta Universitatis Brunensis, Masaryk University, Brno 2012, pp. 47-62.
  • with T. Gizbert-Studnicki, Semantic Sting and Legal Argumentation, [in:] J. Savelka et al. (eds) Argumentation 2011: Alternative Methods of Argumentation in Law (Proceedings), Acta Universitatis Brunensis, Brno 2011, pp. 63-80.
  • Argument "semantycznego ukąszenia” a teoria prawa Jerzego Wróblewskiego [Semantic Sting Argument and Jerzy Wróblewski’s Theory of Law], “Archiwum Filozofii Prawa i Filozofii Społecznej”, nr 1/2010, pp. 39-47.

Presentations

  • with T. Gizbert-Studnicki, Is the Analysis of the Concept of Law a(n) (Im)modest Conceptual Analysis?, Central and Eastern European Network of Jurisprudence (CEENJ), 9/13-14/2018, Zagreb, University of Zagreb, Croatia.
  • with P. Banas, Were Legal Realists Naïve Metaphysicians? Social Ontology 2018: The 11th Biennial Collective Intentionality Conference, 8/22-25/2018, Boston, MA, USA, Tufts University.
  • Who takes the argument from theoretical disagreement seriously?, ARGUMENTATION 2017: International Conference on Alternative Methods of Argumentation in Law, 10/27/2017, Czech Republic, Masaryk University, Brno.
  • with W. Ciszewski, Who’s to Judge a Judge?, International Conference: Who’s Got the Power, 10/5-6/2017, Iceland, University of Iceland, Reykjavik.
  • The epistemic foundations of theoretical disagreement in law, 9th European Congress of Analytic Philosophy (ECAP), 8/21-26/2017, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, Germany, Munich.
  • Whitening Quinean Ethics, 9th European Congress of Analytic Philosophy (ECAP), 8/21-26/2017, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, Germany, Munich.
  • The Real Ratio Legis and Where to Find It, special workshop: “Is There a Ratio Legis and if So, How Many Are There? – The Most Powerful Method of Legal Reasoning Uncovered” (chair: M. Dybowski, V. Klappstein), 28th World Congress of Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy (IVR), 7/17-21/2017, Portugal, University of Lisbon, Lisbon.
  • Theoretical Disagreements in Law (the Epistemological View), working group “Ethics and Law. Legal Positivism. Objectivity, Values and Law,” 28th World Congress of Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy (IVR), 7/17-21/2017, Portugal, University of Lisbon, Lisbon.
  • with M. Dubowska, The Role of Narrative in Legal Disagreement, 5/31 – 6/2/2017, Law and Literature Conference, Czech Republic, Masaryk University, Brno.
  • Do Arguments Help (In Face of Peer Legal Disagreement)?, Argumentation 2015: International Conference on Alternative Methods of Argumentation in Law, 10/16/2015, Czech Republic, Masaryk University, Brno.
  • The Holistic Account of Value-Judgements and It’s Relevance for Legal Theory, 27th IVR World Congress of Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy, 7/27-8/1/2015, USA, Georgetown University, Washington.
  •  A Theoretical Reason to Disagree: A Legal Case, 27th IVR World Congress of Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy, 7/27–8/1/2015, USA, Georgetown University, Washington.
  • Two holistic pragmatisms – two theories of value judgment: Quine & White, ‘The Reaches of Pragmatism’ – Summer Institute in American Philosophy (‘American Voice in Philosophy’), dissertations-in-progress session (F3), 6/8-13/2015, Ireland, University College, Dublin.
  • The Epistemology of Theoretical Disagreement, International Conference PHILOLEP („Philosophy of Legal Philosophy”), 5/22-23/2015, Poland, Jagiellonian University, Cracow.
  • with T. Gizbert-Studnicki, Do Legal Concepts Travel?, The 15th International Roundtable for the Semiotics of Law (IRSL 2014): Legal Interpretation in Practice of International Courts and Tribunals, 6/3-6/2014, Denmark, Centre of Excellence for International Courts, University of Copenhagen, Copenhagen.
  • with T. Gizbert-Studnicki, Over-Aggregated Concepts, Adjective Modifiers, and Argumentation, Argumentation 2013: International Conference on Alternative Methods of Argumentation in Law, 11/9/2013, Czech Republic, Masaryk University, Brno.
  • Are Fundamental Legal Reasons Internal? – A Few Remarks on the Hartian Idea of the Internal Point of View, International Conference RULES 2013, 9/27-29/2013, Poland, Jagiellonian University, Cracow.
  • Why Legal Conventionalism Fails? – Philosophy of Law – Important Issues Workshop, 26th World Congress of Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy, 7/21-27/2013, Brasil, Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais, Belo Horizonte.
  • Pragmatism, Holism and the Concept of Law – Pragmatism and Legal Theory Workshop, 26th World Congress of Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy, 7/21-27/2013, Brasil, Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais, Belo Horizonte.
  • The Path of the Law – A Way to Nowhere? – International Philosophical Rally, 6/27-29/2013, Poland, Adam Mickiewicz University, Poznań.
  • with W. Ciszewski, In Search for the Rational Response: Assessing the Rawlsian Foreground for Resolving Political and Legal Disagreements, Argumentation 2012: International Conference on Alternative Methods of Argumentation in Law, Czech Republic, Brno, 10/26/2012.
  • with T. Gizbert-Studnicki, Semantic Sting and Legal Argumentation, Argumentation 2011: International Conference on Alternative Methods of Argumentation in Law, Czech Republic, Masaryk University, Brno, 10/7/2011.
  • The Banality of Law. Some remarks on Legal Conventionalism, 25th World Congress of Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy (IVR), Germany, Goethe-Universität,  Frankfurt a/M, 08/15-20/2011.
  • Philosophy of lawyer's responsibility, 24th IVR World Congress of Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy, China, Beijing, 09/15-20/2009

Other information

On 4 and 5 Apriil 2019, I co-organize a workshop “Evidence in law and ethics” (ELE2019) at Jagiellonian University. A full description with CfP is available here: https://easychair.org/cfp/ELE2019

Contact details