Emile CHAN Chun Nam
The Furious Will: Virtuous Anger as A Sufficient Condition for The Exercise of Self-Control.
Philosophy of action, philosophy of emotion, epistemology, metaethics, philosophy of mind, Chinese philosophy
A Virtue Reliabilist Theory of Justified Emotions
How to provide justification for emotional states is a hot-debated topic in the philosophy of emotions, more precisely, the epistemology of emotions. Recently, emotional epistemologists have attempted to explain the nature of emotional justification in the evidential fashion. They suggest that emotional states need to be justified by relevant evidence such as the awareness of non-evaluative properties and evaluative perceptions. However, in this research, I shall provide a virtue reliabilist theory of justified emotions, proposing that a particular emotion is epistemically justified if and only if the emotional state is produced by the agent's cognitive abilities, which tend to generate correct emotions. As there is little literature about the relation between reliabilism and emotions, my theory would suggest a new way of justifying emotions.
Before arriving in Manchester, I was a student at Lingnan University in Hong Kong for nearly a decade. I obtained all my sub-degrees, my degree of Bachelor of Arts in Philosophy, and my degree of Master of Philosophy in Philosophy at Lingnan.