A Theory of Temporal Experience
- Dr Joel Smith
- Dr Sean Crawford
Perceptual experience can be distinguished from episodically recalling an event, in that the perceived event seems to be occurring in the present whereas the recalled event does not. Perceived events also seem to fill an extended interval of time. This creates a puzzle, the Puzzle of Temporal Experience. If we only perceive that which occurs in the present, what we perceive cannot fill an interval of time. I provide a solution to this puzzle, on which we experience perceptual events, not as happening now, or as being in the present, but just as happening.
To account for our experience of temporally extended events I defend an Enactivist version of Extensionalism. On this view, temporal properties are perceptually presented in terms of potential bodily activity. For example, I claim that we perceptually present phenomenal duration, being how long an event seems to last, in terms of bodily activity. In other words, I claim that event e seems to last for a certain amount of things that I could have done.
- Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind
- Critical Thinking
I completed both my BA and my MRes (distinction) at the University of Manchester, graduating in 2011 and 2015 respectively. My PhD is generously funded through the President’s Doctoral Scholarship, and AHRC.