

Challenging New State Spaces: The Open Marxism of Henri Lefebvre

Greig Charnock

Now all systems tend to *close off* reflection, to block off horizon. This work wants to break up systems, not to substitute another system, but to *open up* through thought and action towards *possibilities* by showing the horizon and the road. Against a form of reflection which tends towards formalism, a thought which tends towards an opening leads the struggle (Lefebvre 1996/1968: 65).

The unfixity of form signals its openness to a future (Gunn 1992: 32)

The recent publication of biographies of the French philosopher Henri Lefebvre (1905-1991) (Shields 1999; Elden 2004a; Merrifield 2006), in addition to the appearance of new English translations of his books and essays (e.g. Lefebvre 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003), attests to a renewed appreciation of his works' contemporary resonance (see also Elden 2006). As Neil Brenner and Stuart Elden survey, his 'writings have served as central reference points within a broad range of theoretical and political projects' (2001: 763), ranging from urban theory and the struggle for substantive citizenship to debates over the meaning and politics of space. A dynamic and multifaceted thinker, Lefebvre came to address many of the questions for which his work is today considered germinal relatively late in his own life; however, throughout most of his adult life he maintained a steadfast commitment to Marxism, to dialectical thought, and to a certain notion of *critique*. Unlike many of his French contemporaries, Lefebvre recognised the continuities running through German Idealism, Kant, Hegel and Marx; suspicious of dogma, he focused upon questions of alienation, objectification, and reification on both sides of the 'iron curtain', often risking intellectual and political marginalisation during his own lifetime.¹

¹ Lefebvre was a leading intellectual figure within the French Communist Party (PCF) before and after World War II. His relationship with the Party he joined in 1928 became increasingly strained due to his early work on logic, and because of

The argument in this paper suggests that much of the recent enthusiasm for Lefebvre's later work, and on space in particular, too frequently translates into work of a distinctively non-critical kind, insofar as the notion of critique is largely absent from it. This absence in an emergent inter-disciplinary literature on the 'new state spaces' (Brenner 2004) is especially conspicuous given the frequent reference to Lefebvre as an interlocutor in its development. The argument to be developed in this paper is that Lefebvre's own work on space in fact forewarns against the adoption of an approach such as that which underpins the new state spaces literature and its attendant concern with the 'new political economy of scale' (Brenner 2004; Jessop 2002).

The argument hinges upon my locating Lefebvre's work within another critical tradition, that of 'open Marxism'. Bonefeld, Gunn and Psychopedis (1992: xii) encapsulate this approach by juxtaposing it with 'closed' Marxisms, which

accepts the horizons of a given world as its own theoretical horizons and/or it announces a determinism which is causalist or teleological as the case may be ... These two aspects of closure are interrelated because *acceptance of horizons amounts to acceptance of their inevitability* and because *determinist theory* becomes complicit in the foreclosing of possibilities which a contradictory world entails.

This being so, a central target for Marxism with an open character is fetishism. Fetishism is the construal (in theory) and the constitution (in practice) of social relations as 'thinglike', perverting such relations into a commodified and sheerly structural form. Closed Marxism substitutes fetishised theory for the – critical – theory of fetishism which open Marxism undertakes. Hostile to the movement of contradiction, the former reinforces and reproduces the fetishism which, officially, it proclaims against.²

his criticisms of official Soviet 'diamat', of events in Hungary in 1956, and of the PCF's failure to support the Algerian revolution. Lefebvre was eventually expelled from the Party in 1958.

² This passage signals the specific concern of writers in the open Marxist tradition as compared with the more heterogeneous tag of 'Western Marxism', for example (cf. Jay 1984).

It follows, therefore, that the open Marxist notion of 'critique' conveys a very precise meaning and connotes a unique and heterodox approach to social science.

This was made evident by the open Marxist sustained questioning of the methodological bases of the 'strategic-relational approach', or SRA (Jessop 1990, 2008), its contribution to scholarship on the so-called post-Fordist era of capitalist restructuring since the 1980s, and by the charge that it precisely reinforces and reproduces a fetishism which it proclaims against (see Bonefeld & Holloway, eds, 1991). This debate is briefly summarised in section one. In section two, I show how the project of critique also underpins the work of Lefebvre in general and the clarion call-like opening to *The Right to the City*, with which this paper begins, especially. In so doing, I present the case for reading Lefebvre as an open Marxist.³ I explain how the 'opening' he deemed necessary in *The Right to the City* reflected a long-term preoccupation with the crisis of philosophy, a rejection of all variants of structuralist Marxism, and the elaboration of a *métaphilosophie* drawing upon Marx's writing *in toto*.

Having established the case for reading Lefebvre as an open Marxist, the remainder of the paper considers the critique of politico-economic space today. In section three, I excavate the methodological bases of the emergent new state spaces literature. At the very least, I suggest, it appears incongruent to appeal to Lefebvre as an interlocutor in the further development the SRA in accordance with its structuralist-regulationist foundations. In section four, however, I push the argument further by demonstrating that while Lefebvre's later work on space goes beyond Marx in important respects, it remains methodologically consistent with his open Marxism. Lefebvre's approach to pertinent questions of his time retained the character of critique while resisting the prioritisation of systemic, formal, or closed thought. Potentially, then, Lefebvre today offers us an entry into the critique of the space of political economy that poses serious questions to the emergent new state spaces literature. This

³ This reading of Lefebvre resonates with Dimenberg (1998), Elden (2004a), and Jay (1984: 293-9).

is not to argue that a reading of Lefebvre necessitates a (very un-Lefebvrian) 'theological' adherence to some texts or to 'one true Marxism' (Elden 2004: 16-17), but to highlight the problems associated with the closed theorisation of the new state spaces approach.

1. Critique, Regulationism, and Post-Fordism

The passage quoted in the introduction neatly captures the thrust of, what Bonefeld, Gunn, and Psychopedis (1992: xii) identify as, a 'subterranean tradition' of open Marxism evidenced in the writing of Luxemburg, the early Lukács, Korsch, Bloch, Adorno, Rubin, Pashukanis, Rosdolsky and Agnoli. What these writers share – and therefore what separates them from the wider Marxist tradition – is a certain comprehension of what it means to think *dialectically*:

The attempt to understand the 'inner nature' of social existence involves a way of thinking which moves within the object (i.e. the social-historical form of human relations) of its thinking. Dialectics does not proceed to its object from outside but from inside as it attempts to appropriate conceptually social reality in its proper motion. Dialectical thinking conceptualises itself within, and as a moment of, its object. Such a conceptualisation of social existence seeks an understanding of the apparently isolated facts of life as comprising a mode of existence of social relations (Bonefeld 1993a: 21).

When applied to political economy, this approach posits capital – the movement of value – as the conceptual object that is to be understood dialectically and from a subjective positionality located within capital as a 'mode of existence' of social relations – that of labour.

... Labour is the presupposition of social existence as a whole, a presupposition from which capital cannot autonomise itself. Capital is dependent upon labour. Capital lives by turning labour against itself on the basis of the fetishistic existence of wage-labour, that is of a value-creating commodity (Bonefeld 1995: 181).

The class struggle, for this tradition, is therefore that of labour's struggle *in and against* capital (Bonefeld 1993a: 26); productive human activity subsists through capital but in the '*mode of being denied*' (Gunn 1991: 199). This focuses critique upon the question of the *social constitution of economic forms*, and Bonefeld (2004: 111) invokes a line from Herbert Marcuse to reinforce the at once negative and subversive character of dialectical critique: 'the constitution of the world occurs behind the backs of the individuals; yet it is their work'. Indeed, Marx's own critique of political economy poses the problem by asking the question: 'why does labour assume the form of value, means of production the form of capital, means of workers' subsistence the form of wages, increased productivity of labour the form of increased surplus value' (Rubin 1990/1928: 43)? In asking this question, and answering it in *Capital*, Marx bequeathed an

... idea of form as mode of existence [that] makes it possible to see the generic as inherent in the specific, and the abstract as inherent in the concrete, because if form *is* existence then the concrete can *be* abstract (and vice versa) and the specific can *be* generic (and vice versa) ... Those who see form as a mode of existence have to try and decode the forms in and of themselves [and] have to dwell upon critique and the movement of contradiction as making clear, for its own part, the 'forms' that class struggle may take (Bonefeld, Gunn & Psychopedis 1992: xvi).

For the open Marxist tradition, then, 'the critique of political economy has to show the genesis of economic forms and therewith the constitutive social practice that exists through them in the mode of being denied ... [It] amounts, then, to the conceptualisation of human social praxis in and through perverted forms (*begriffene Praxis*)' (Bonefeld 2001: 58, emphasis added; cf. Reichelt 2004).

Of course, the critique of political economy involves more than simply asking questions, however important they might be. It also embraces the notion of contradiction as being key to the dialectic and to the dynamism of political economy as a concrete object of inquiry. Gunn (1992) explains

the open Marxist 'triadic' understanding of the *movement of contradiction* as follows:

... all contradictions go in threes, at least. For a contradiction can be contradicted only *by a contradiction*: were no thing (a contradiction) [i] to be contradicted by something the outcome would be incoherence or stasis rather than the movement — the "can be contradicted" or *modus vivendi* — of the contradiction itself ... In other words *contradiction-contradicted* [ii] is, at least potentially, the condition of contradiction itself (p. 27) ... [However], were contradiction to consist in (i) alone it would be itself, purely, which is to say that it would not be ... For it to be *and* not be — for it to subsist in its own mode, i.e. as contradiction — (ii) has to come into play. However a contradiction contradicted by nothing would remain something, i.e. a non-entity; and so contradiction (ii) must carry in its wake contradiction (iii). Contradiction (iii) counts as *something* from the standpoint of contradiction (i) (p. 30).

Through a method termed 'determinate abstraction' (*bestimmte abstraktion*), Gunn (1992: 27) can report that 'if A is the mode of existence of B then A is A and not-A at the same time'. In other words, 'it is the existing-not-yet dimension of being which gives sense to the notion of real contradiction' (1992: 28). Or, in Marxist terms of the capital/labour interrelation: 'only within this interrelation (a relation of struggle) can labour as an abstraction subsisting not just in theory but in practice appear. "Work ... which is liberated is liberated from work" [quoting Negri]: communism, this liberation, already ex-sists' (1992: 17) — it is the 'real movement of the working class' (1992: 14).⁴ In this way, open Marxism logically highlights the 'unfixity' of social forms and therefore their 'openness to a future' (1992: 32).

The particularities of such dialectical thought are more readily understandable when juxtaposed with competing Marxian approaches; and for this reason, the debate on *Post-Fordism and Social Form*

(Bonefeld & Holloway 1991) warrants a brief review. While earlier debates had explored the problem of theorising the 'state-form' and its relationship with class at a more abstract level (Clarke 1991a), this subsequent debate revolved around the proposal, rejection, and subsequent defence of theories of post-Fordism as a changing model of state regulation in advanced industrial economies.⁵ In it, Bob Jessop played a key role by articulating the complexities of the 'regulation approach' (RA), from which the Fordism thesis originated,⁶ and by reasserting its continued validity in the face of trenchant criticism from proponents of open Marxism. The post-Fordist thesis, and its regulationist origins, were criticised on three inter-related grounds, here presented schematically (see Jessop 1991):

1. The RA externalises class struggle vis-à-vis the 'objective' laws of capitalist development and, in so doing, 'derives social conflict from pre-formed, ahistorical categories' (Bonefeld 1993b: 32). The historical constitution of these laws is presupposed in terms of a logical construct reduces labour to a passive object of history. In other words, the RA is 'structuralist-functionalist' in its make up; it adopts a 'capital-logic'

⁴ Here, Gunn is adhering to the conceptualisation: 'Existence = ek-sistence = ecstasis or ecstasy. We live ecstatically, ahead of ourselves, into and through our forms' (1992: 42, fn. 30).

⁵ 'Post-Fordism' describes a global shift away from post-War 'Fordist' patterns of mass production accompanied by rising wages and expanding consumption, broadly Keynesian practices of state intervention, a commitment to welfare policies, and industrial bargaining. Having entered crisis in the 1970s, the model is said to be in the uneven process of supplantation by 'lean' production practices, flexible labour markets, the retrenchment of welfare policy, and diminished state intervention in the economy generally.

⁶ The RA 'explores the interconnections between the institutional forms and dynamic regularities of capitalist economies ... The RA focuses on the changing combinations of economic *and extra-economic* institutions and practices that help to secure, if only temporarily and always in specific economic spaces, a certain stability and predictability in accumulation – despite the fundamental

approach, ascribing to capital a subjectivity and dynamism of its own. A result of drawing upon Gramscian theory, this echoes a tradition of separating economic, political, and social 'spheres' in structuralist-functional Marxist more generally. Here, the state appears as a supra-temporal, trans-historical 'empty-box', open to capture by any configuration of social forces aligned to a 'hegemonic project'; as Jessop (1990: 270) posits, 'the power of the state is the power of the forces acting in and through the state'.

2. Capitalism is a *closed* system in the RA. It is here to stay, notwithstanding its crisis tendencies. The state responds to the contradictions of capital in the mode of an external relation (Clarke 1991b); crisis confronts the state (understood as a 'self-substituting system', cf. Jessop 2008: 7) as an external shock which prompts reorganisation; and labour is resigned to its status as force for (social-democratic) reformism from its positionality within the 'sphere' of wider society. This contrasts with the open Marxist instance upon the internal crisis of the state-form which points to the possibilities of social change not delimited by the parameters of structuralist formalism.
3. Regulation is seen as a positive activity. State managers can pre-empt certain crisis tendencies (both in economic and legitimation terms) and can strategise appropriately (though not always effectively); whether by adopting policies to re-secure the longer term technical preconditions for accumulation or policies intended to mitigate against instances of socio-political unrest and conflict. An alternative approach is to view the role of the state is essentially *negative*: 'whilst the state can act as an employer and intervene directly in some sectors of the economy, it cannot displace the market without destroying the capitalist mode of production. At best it can intervene to remove barriers to economic growth' (Burnham 1990: 183).

contradictions and conflicts generated by the very dynamic of capitalism' (Jessop & Sum 2006: ?).

While, ultimately, both sides emerged from the debate without reconciliation (Holloway 1991; Jessop 2008: 22-25), the debate retains significance for two reasons. First, the RA continues to inform the SRA which has been generally endorsed by the new state spaces literature. Notwithstanding the language of 'structural coupling' and 'material interdependence' (Jessop 2008: 26), the SRA persists in its external separation of the economic and the extra-economic (Jessop 2002: 9), and with it the separation of structure (invoking laws of 'natural necessity', see Bonfeld 1993b) and struggle. Therefore it is reasonable to reconsider certain probing questions in the light of more recent interest in the new state spaces literature. I turn to this in section three. Second, the debate serves to highlight the irreconcilable incompatibilities between open Marxism and structuralist-functionalist Marxism more generally, and paves the way for a fresh reading of Lefebvre's work in section two. The debate reinforces that, at root, the question of the social constitution of economic forms is of critical importance. Open Marxism seeks to reveal the human content of formal economic categories, rather than to harness and affirm them for the purposes of first-order social analysis. In other words, it highlights how human content (labour) is suspended (*Aufhebung*) in economic forms and categories as a determining force, within and against its negation (Capital) (Bonfeld 2007a: 6; cf. Reichelt 2004).

Gunn (1991, 1992) makes this enduring distinction in another way. He argues we should reject the anti-Hegelian and structuralist assertion of a 'break' in the intellectual development of Marx (*pace* Althusser & Balibar 1998/1968) – with the 'scientific', mature Marx on the one hand, and the 'political, utopian, or eschatological' early Marx (Jessop 2001: 90), on the other. Also, along with this, Gunn adds, we should jettison the notion of first- and second-order (meta-) theorisation as two complementary but distinct exercises, as implied in critical realist methodology (cf. Jessop 2005). Only then can Marxism aspire to be '*practically reflexive*' – a '*unity of theory and practice*'.

Theorising is reflexive when, and insofar as, it asks after the validity of its own categories, concepts, truth-criteria and/or terms. Theorising is practically reflexive when it does this *in the course of* asking after its

practical – its social or historical – situatedness. The phrase ‘in the course of’ reports the *internal* relatedness of theory to practice for which Marx contends. Were theory merely to ask after its conceptual validity and, separately, to reflect upon its social preconditions (as in bourgeois ‘sociology of knowledge’) then – as reported in the conjunction ‘and’ – it would regard theory and practice as linked merely in an external way (Gunn 1991: 195-6).

This Marxism differs from that proffered by structuralism-regulationism in all its guises, which views ‘historical materialism as a *general* theory of society which awaits only its historically rich *application*’ (1991: 207). The implications of upholding a dualism between theory/metatheory and genus/species are both scholarly *and* political: ‘categorical appeal to an alienated practice reproduces the alienation of practice rather than the (possible) practice which, to use an ancient Marxist expression, might turn alienation on its head’ (1991: 206). The refusal to accept this dualism therefore yields a critical theory that is ‘open’; it refuses to marginalise contradiction as incoherence, or to ‘subtract class struggle from the categories of Marx’s mature work’ (1991: 206; see criticism 1 of the RA, above).⁷ And, as I suggest in the next section, it is to this version of open, practically reflexive Marxism to which Henri Lefebvre subscribed.

2. Lefebvre’s Open Marxism: Dialectics and *Métaphilosophie*

Fetishism properly so called only appeared when abstractions escaped the control of the thought and will of man. Thus commercial value and money are only in themselves quantitative abstractions: abstract expressions of social, human relations; but these abstractions materialize, intervene as entities in social life and in history, and end by dominating instead of being dominated (Lefebvre, quoted in Poster 1975: 55).

⁷ For a recent restatement of these objections, *pace* neo-Gramscian approaches to world order, see relevant chapters in Bieler, Bonefeld, Burnham & Morton (2006).

Lefebvre's 'work on philosophy and Marxism, and the philosophy of Marxism, is the key to his writings' (Elden 2006: 199). Yet it is important to note the manner in which Lefebvre discovered and embraced Marx; that is, through Hegel (Dimendberg 1998; Elden 2004a: 18-19).⁸ This marks Lefebvre out from many of his contemporaries, who were either ignorant, or dismissive, of Marx's debt to Hegel. It also explains his enduring commitment to an open Marxism which – as indicated by the above passage from his 1948 book *Le Marxisme* – is developed around alienation or, in more open Marxist terms, social constitution and the question of form.

An earlier book, *Dialectical Materialism* (1968/1940),⁹ affirms Lefebvre's grasp of Marx's method as derived from Hegel. In it, he writes: '[Man] is alienated by being temporarily dominated by a world that is "other" even though he himself gave birth to it, and so equally real' (1968/1940: 63). The version of dialectical materialism he advocates to decipher a fetishised social reality is distinctly practically reflexive in its method:

[Men] do not – they cannot – recognise in the market their own handiwork turning brutally and oppressively against them. They believe in the absolute objectivity, the blind fatality of social facts, which they call destiny or providence ... But to get to know economic phenomena is ... to study their objective and substantial process, while at the same time destroying and denying this absolute substantiality by determining it as a manifestation of man's practical activity, seen as a whole (praxis). Because the actual content, and the movement of this content, consists in the living relations of men amongst

⁸ It is noteworthy for the following discussion that Lefebvre co-translated Marx's then little known 'Economic-Philosophical Manuscripts' of 1844 for a French audience in the 1920s (Elden 2006: 189), and was an early translator of Hegel. For an open Marxist reading of the 1844 Manuscripts – one that highlights the unity of Marx's philosophical and economic concerns as well as the Manuscripts' implications for the notion of critique – see Backhaus (2004).

⁹ Lefebvre was still a Party member at the time of publication of this book; the title represents a concession to official discourse (see Elden 2004a) and should not detract from proper consideration of its content.

themselves, men can escape from economic fatalities (1968/1940: 94).

Moreover, Lefebvre recognises that this insight informed Marx's critique of political economy; 'if we want to understand the fundamentals of his thought', he writes, 'this word "critique" must be taken in its widest sense. Political economy ... has got to be criticised and transcended' (1968/1940: 97). Lefebvre subsequently rejects forms of thought that fail to uncover and reinvigorate the negated human content of economic forms and structures. In so doing, he demonstrates a comprehension of the notion of 'existence-not-yet' (Gunn 1992: 14) as one of '*Becoming*' (1968/1940: 29-46):

In the form of a general theory of the Becoming and its laws, or of a theory of knowledge, or of concrete logic, dialectical materialism can only be an instrument of research and action, never a dogma ... It is defined negatively, by being opposed to any of those doctrines which limit human existence, either from without or within, by subordinating it to some external existence or else by reducing it to a one-sided element or partial experience seen as being privileged and definitive (1968/1940: 109-110).

'Becoming', as discussed by Hegel in his *Science of Logic*, is for Lefebvre related to another Hegelian term *Aufhebung*: 'these various determinations assert themselves against their own reduction, against the logical and practical negation which restrains them but does not succeed in destroying them. They assert themselves within the reduction' (Lefebvre 1973/1971: 85).¹⁰ In so placing emphasis upon Hegel's influence upon Marx's own dialectic, Lefebvre repeatedly highlights the non-teleological character of that dialectic, and the *triadic* movement of contradiction it embraces, in his work (e.g. Lefebvre 2003/1986; 2004/1992: 11-12). On more than one occasion, Lefebvre refers to a dialectic of 'presence' and 'absence' (e.g. Lefebvre 2003/1980) which

¹⁰ For a critical distinction between the concept Becoming and the modern idea of 'progress', see Psychopedis (2004: 84).

parallels what Bonefeld (2007b), following Adorno, terms the 'non-conceptual within the conceptual'. Indeed, in a book devoted to the crucial differences between dialectical and formal logic the topic, Lefebvre (1947/1975) explains the movement of dialectic thought in a manner remarkably similar to Gunn's, as discussed earlier. Elden (2004) usefully summarises Lefebvre's triadic dialectic as follows:

To take a formal example. A logician brings in term, 'A', and then its opposite, 'not A'. On this basis we can assert that 'A is not not-A'. However ... Lefebvre makes ... the point, that 'A' itself is the third term to 'plus A' and 'minus A'. Lefebvre's point is that 'not A' is created, posited, only in order to vanish, to secure a new identity. The negation is itself negated (p. 29) ... Dialectical logic "does not reject the principle of identity, it gives it a content". If formal logic says 'A is A' dialectical logic does not say 'A is not-A' in order to contradict it, but to recognise its limitations ... To say 'A is A' is true in that it can describe and be transcended, but it is false if it is taken as an absolute, statically. Dialectical logic allows the analysis of simple and complex natures; it can go beyond mere classification; it can analyse becoming (p. 32-33 cf. Lefebvre 2003/1982).

This dialectical understanding lies behind Lefebvre's advocacy of the 'regressive-progressive' method of analysis; in short, a historically situated means of recalling to mind and analysis the historical and conceptual moment in which the subject (first term) is negated and suspended in contradiction within and against the object (second term) (see Elden 2004: 38).¹¹ The following passage from *The Production of Space* shows this method at work, and further accords with the method of

¹¹ In a metaphorical representation of the regressive-progressive method, entitled 'A Vision', Lefebvre (1995/1962) writes 'the past cannot be described as a mere memory. It is still there, a danger overcome. It no longer has any effect on me, but it is still active in the distance, and when it expires it will be reborn; it tells me of the obstacles I have to overcome if I am to reach the shore'. Such thinking, I propose, is akin to the method explained by Bonefeld's account of the open categorisation of 'primitive accumulation' in Marx's *Capital*: 'the constitutive presupposition of capitalism is also its permanent premise' (2007a: 5).

determinate abstraction which Gunn (1991: 205; cf. Bonefeld 1993a) insists is central to practically reflexive theorisation:

It is never easy to get back from the object (product or work) to the activity that produced and/or created it. It is the only way, however, to illuminate the object's nature, or, if you will the object's relationship to nature, and reconstitute the process of its genesis and the development of its meaning. All other ways of proceeding can succeed only in constructing an abstract object – a model (Lefebvre 1991/1974: 113).¹²

This passage hints at Lefebvre's animosity toward any theory that attempts to impose a supratemporal logic or formal blueprint upon a social content; 'Marx ... conceived of a path, not a model' (Lefebvre 2003/1970: 110, 144). Structuralist attempts to construct a general 'scientific' model of capitalist accumulation and hegemony in readiness for empirical application incurred Lefebvre's wrath for precisely this mistake. Lefebvre rejects any such notion of 'scientism' (Lefebvre 2003/1971: 39) in Marx:

It is not a system or dogma but a reference. Marxism is a method that on the one hand, depends upon a certain number of determined concepts but, on the other hand, *is analytic and critical of a certain historical process of becoming*. As a consequence of this movement, the real tends toward the possible while, at the same time, eliminating all other potentialities, though the possible also comes up against the impossible, *discernible only in the course of practical action*. *This attitude implies a triadic analysis of movement and becoming: reality/possibility/impossibility*. Moreover, there is a strategic objective: to change the world (Lefebvre 1988: 77, emphasis added).

Elsewhere, Lefebvre (2000/1971: 71) duly warns against analysing society 'according to its own categories'; 'its categories are part of its

¹² Merrifield (2000) perceptively parallels this passage with the fetishism chapter in volume one of Marx's *Capital*.

publicity – pawns in a game of strategy and neither unbiased or disinterested; they serve a dual practical and ideological purpose’.

In place of ‘systemic’, formal thought, then, Lefebvre repeatedly proposed a practically reflexive ‘*métaphilosophie*’ that reaffirms the early Marx’s announcement of a ‘crisis of philosophy’ (Lefebvre 1988: 84; 1996/1968: 90-91; cf. Gunn 1991 and Elden 2004a: 85).¹³ ‘The task of metaphilosophy is to uncover the characteristics of the philosophy that used to be, its language and its goals, to demonstrate their limitations and to transcend them’, writes Lefebvre (1991/1974: 405). ‘The fact is ... that philosophy proper came to a halt when faced with contradictions that it had called forth but could not resolve ... Hegel came close to a solution, but after him the dividing-line between the *conceived* and the directly *lived* was restored as the outer frontier of the Logos and the limit of philosophy as such’ (1991/1974: 405-6). Philosophy, in other words, missed its opportunity to overcome this dividing line and therefore to realise itself (cf. Adorno 2007/1966: 3). This recognition denotes the moment Marx breaks with Hegel and his idealist ‘cop-out’ which saw the modern state as the ‘actuality of the ethical Idea’ (Lefebvre 1968/1940: 81, 112-13; Elden 2004: 34). ‘Philosophy since Hegel has become institutionalised; it is a public service of the state, and its discourse can only be ideological (Lefebvre 2003/1970: 65). In the face of this crisis, as Merrifield (2000: 178) puts it, Lefebvre’s

Metaphilosophy is an antidote: it attempts to surmount separations and Sunderings, tries to unite speculative philosophy and critical theory with political action. It seeks critical and self-critical knowledge. It alone can expose phoney transcendence in the name of real transcendence. Metaphilosophy can only be sanctioned in revolt – a revolt inside one’s head and out on the street with others.¹⁴

¹³ Except when quoting from other texts, I use the French word *métaphilosophie* throughout this paper to clearly distinguish Lefebvre’s approach from that criticised by Gunn (1991).

¹⁴ Lefebvre (1968/1966: 21) asserts that ‘every positivist sociology presenting itself as “Marxist” has always tended to reformism’.

Lefebvre's pursuit of this project necessarily placed him at odds with structuralist Marxism, which he criticised in several of his works from the 1960s and 70s, primarily because 'it denies history and becoming' (Elden 2004a: 24).¹⁵ 'Louis Althusser and his followers', he wrote in 1975, 'have sealed the political break which separates Marx from Hegel: the critic of the state from its apologist' (in Elden 2004a: 228). In *The Survival of Capitalism*, for example, Lefebvre lambastes 'certain 'sociologists'' who assert that society has achieved 'mastery' over its constitutive social relations, and who posit

... the state as subject, as superior consciousness, able to maintain and support its own conditions. This is flagrant ideology (among 'Marxists' too). The social relations are 'unconsciously' endowed with a kind of *inertia* which turns them virtually into *things*, in spite of the polite 'dialectical' label which is tagged onto this so-called materialism (or rather philosophism) (Lefebvre 1976/1973: 9).

Again in this text, Lefebvre shuns 'models' and with it 'the classic methods of induction and deduction' (1976/1973: 55; cf. Gunn 1991 and 1992), advocating instead a metaphilosophical 'transduction: the construction of virtual objects, the exploration of the possible' (1976/1973: 61). 'The rigidification of a "marxist" concept such as "mode of production" (or any other), and the systematisation which derives from this as a separately held concept, destroy Marx's perspective, which is to understand what is happening in order to transform it, to seize the "lived" in order to beat a path towards life' (1976/1973: 61).

In demanding the opening of Marxist theory, Lefebvre recognises the limits of structuralism both in analytical-explanatory and political terms. One the one hand, structuralism's closed analysis

... avoids the problem of the reproduction of the relations of production. It simply repeats, redundantly, the definition of the mode

¹⁵ In a 1969 Preface, Lefebvre (1947/1975: 26-27) rejects the 'structuralist notion of discontinuity' in Marx's work for not recognising Hegel's enduring influence.

of production. Capitalism is capitalism – a tautology which substitutes itself for analysis of the changes in capitalism, changes which cannot be reduced to variations around a structural invariance ... Incoherence becomes methodological, under the heading of rigour (1976/1973: 65; cf. Bonefeld 1993b).

On the other hand, the political implications of structuralism are evident in the Althusserian and Gramscian commitment to a politics of 'the Party' – a politics the open Marxist tradition rejects outright (Bonefeld 2002). On the one hand, 'Althusser looks at the political practice in which Marx's name is invoked and considers it already internal to the socialist mode of production ... We find out who and what [he] is talking about: *political practice* (that of the party), accompanied by its *theoretical practice*, which is the elaboration of experience (apparently within the party, the collective thinker)' (1976/1973: 64-65). While in Gramsci, the 'philosophy of praxis ... turns into the justification of one particular practice – that of the Party, the modern prince. In other words, it becomes a philosophy of Machiavellianism, bestowing the cachet of philosophy on political pragmatism' (Lefebvre 1968/1966: 36). For Lefebvre, a politics of the Party, commensurable with structuralist-regulationist theories of 'hegemonic' struggle generally, misses the point of Marx's critique:

the ultimate political goal of the movement is the abolition of politics – the withering away of the state once its functions have been taken over by society. [This] point is of major importance. To leave it out of consideration is to make Marx a Machiavellian (or Machiavelli a precursor of Marx), *to view politics or the state as an eternal, supratemporal essence* (1968/1966: 165, emphasis added; cf. Bonefeld 2002).

It is through *métaphilosophie*, then, that Lefebvre is able to build upon Marx's writing *in toto* – creatively synthesising key ideas from others like Nietzsche and Heidegger along the way (Merrifield 1995; Elden 2004b) – so as to develop his own (non-structuralist-regulationist) critical theory. This intellectual-political foundation is, I contend, fundamental to grasping Lefebvre's thinking about two inter-related themes for which his writing is

today considered germinal: 'everyday life' and 'the production of space'. With this in mind, the remainder of this paper reconsiders the philosophical foundations of an emergent 'new state spaces' literature which seeks to marry structuralist-regulationist Marxist state theory with socio-spatial theory.

3. Regulationism from Fordism to the New State Spaces

I shall argue ... that regulatory responses to the crisis of North Atlantic Fordism have reconfigured the landscapes of western European statehood in a number of quite fundamental ways that can be analysed in general terms, across multiple national contexts (Brenner 2004: 18).

Since the debates of the 1980s, thinking about the crisis of Fordism has moved with the times – taking into account the ascendancy of 'globalisation', in particular, as a social science 'keyword' since the 1990s. Jessop, a key figure in past debates concerning the reorganisation of state and economy in regions of the international political economy once broadly identifiable as 'Keynesian Welfare National States' (KWNS), has continued to contribute to an emergent literature on the subsequent emergence of 'Schumpeterian Workfare Post-National Regimes' (SWPR) in the context of globalisation – for example, under *New Labour* in the UK (Jessop 2003) – and through the lens of the SRA. For the SRA, the KWNS and the SWPR are intended heuristic, 'ideal-type' models. They are intended to convey a degree of analytical parallelism in the restructuring of a variety of advanced capitalist countries since the 1970s along broadly neoliberal lines, the transition process being 'marked by a concern with *rolling back* the exceptional forms of state intervention linked to attempts at crisis management in the previous regime (Atlantic Fordism) as well as the more normal forms of intervention associated with the [KWNS]; and by a concern with *rolling forward* the institutional architecture for a new regime, securing the balance of forces needed for this, and establishing the new forms of state intervention deemed appropriate to that regime should it be successfully consolidated' (2003: 7-8).

For the SRA, this shift from one 'mode of regulation' (2004: 55) to another is both 'structural' and 'strategic' (2003: 5; cf. Brenner 2003: 297), as is the more encompassing process of globalisation (Jessop 2008: 179). An SRA understanding of both necessitates consideration of the struggles waged by a plurality of 'social forces' vying for hegemonic control of restructuring processes and to champion their preferred 'economic imaginary' in different settings: an ability 'to redefine specific economies as subjects, sites, and stakes of competition and/or as objects of regulation; to generalise new norms of production and consumption; and to identify the broader range of extra-economic conditions favourable to the "new economy"' (Jessop 2004: 48). The varied results of neoliberal restructuring in different contexts – ranging spatially from the national to the local and beyond – reflect the 'path-dependency' of attempts to engineer a shift away from the KWNS (cf. Brenner 2003), but can nonetheless – through 'rational abstraction' (Jessop 2008) – be encapsulated in the SWPR ideal-type. The recognition of the possibility of variety of concrete outcomes at different spatial scales – and of the consolidation of different and newly relativised modes of economic regulation even within a single national state – is in fact a defining feature of the SWPR (2004: 56-58), and demarcates it from the 'national economy' around which the KWNS was organised (2004: 51; Brenner 2004: 121). This understanding clearly distinguishes the SRA from more 'state-centric' approaches that misinterpret globalisation as an inexorable process eating away at the sovereignty and regulatory capacities of purely reactive national states (cf. Brenner 1999). Rather, for Jessop (2008: 196), 'national states have become even more important arbiters of the movement of state powers upwards, downwards, and sideways'. Additionally, this approach warns against the reification of scale in political-economic analysis; scale is, for the SRA, socially constructed and therefore contested (cf. Brenner 1998, 2001a; Marston 2000). The SRA is therefore sensitive to 'the new political economy of scale' (Jessop 2002: 179), the possibility of 'multiscalar metagovernance' (Jessop 2008: 198-224, on the EU), and to the repositioning of regions and cities ('sites of economic competitiveness') as 'part of the more general structural

transformation and strategic reorientation of the Fordist economy and its [KWNS]' (Jessop 2004: 51).

It is easy to discern, from the above synopsis of the socio-spatially attuned take on capitalist restructuring provided by the SRA, that the lens through which a shift in the 'mode of regulation' has been identified is characteristically structuralist-regulationist. The methodological assumptions underpinning this reading of the political economy of neoliberalism are equally evident in other contributions to the literature on the new political economy of scale. For example, MacLeod (2001: 821) endorses the RA as offering 'a rich set of tools through which to examine the internal governance of regional economies – systems of corporate regulation, labour relations, development agencies – alongside the wider networks of political and economic institutions within which regions are positioned'. While MacLeod and Goodwin (1999:517) argue, in explicitly neo-Gramscian terms, that 'through the endeavour to articulate a particular hegemonic project, there will be an incessant search by dominant social and political forces to construct the state form and associated scalar "fix" – the institutional site suitably organised along functional and territorial lines – which can best further their particular strategies'. More recently, Jessop, Brenner and Jones (forthcoming) together argue that an SRA sensitive to the multi-dimensional interplay between 'territory', 'scale', 'place', and 'networks' suggests

(a) that ... their relative roles in securing the overall coherence of spatio-temporal relations in capitalist (and other) social formations may vary historically and contextually; (b) that crises of accumulation and regulation can be explored in terms of the growing disjunction among historically specific institutional manifestations of these four socio-spatial dimensions as a basis for the structured coherence of capitalism; and (c) that strategies of crisis resolution entail attempts to reorder the relative importance among the four dimensions and their associated institutional expressions in relation to circuits of capital and modes of regulation.

In short, the SRA is ready, equipped with its ideal-type models, for historically rich application, underpinned by an enduring commitment to

the structuralist-regulationist, indeterminate separation of structure and struggle.

It is all the more surprising, therefore, when Lefebvre appears in the new state spaces literature as an interlocutor. Neil Brenner, who's role in translating and exposing Lefebvre's work to an Anglophone audience has been invaluable, also draws upon Lefebvre's writing on space as contained in *The Production of Space* and the – mostly non-translated – four volumes of *De l'Etat* while at the same time endorsing a regulationist account of capitalist restructuring (see, also, Brenner 2003). He finds, in Lefebvre, a series of passages that help to illuminate both the social construction and historical specificity of capitalist spatiality, as well an 'ontology' of scalar construction that emphasises perpetual motion and flux over inertia and fixity (Brenner 1998, 2000). 'The key to Lefebvre's approach to globalisation', writes Brenner (1997: 145-146), 'is his concern to analyse dynamic transformations of all sub-global scales within the encompassing framework of space on a world scale, while simultaneously avoiding the spatial fetishism that reduces social relations embedded within forms of socio-spatial organisation to static, reified objects'. Brenner goes on to criticise the Westphalian national state-centricity of globalisation debates within the social sciences (Brenner 1997; 2004), a task for which Lefebvre's writings on space are indisputably well suited to assist. While recognising the debt to Lefebvre in his book *New State Spaces*, Brenner is able to advance an alternative and necessarily more spatially attuned approach to thinking about statehood (*Staatlichkeit*):

[the state] is not a thing, container, or platform, but a socially produced, conflictual, and dynamically changing matrix of sociospatial interaction. The spaces of state power are not simply 'filled', as if they were pre-given territorial containers. Instead, state spatiality is actively produced and transformed through regulatory projects and socio-political struggles articulated in diverse institutional sites and at a range of geographical scales. Therefore, the traditional Westphalian image of states as being located within static, self-contained territorial arenas *must be replaced by a dialectical, processual analysis of how historically specific configurations of*

state space are produced and incessantly reworked (Brenner 2004: 76, emphasis added).¹⁶

Brenner's work presents us with a possible problem of antinomy. In a 2001 commentary on Lefebvre's essay 'Comments on a New State Form', Brenner (2001b: 797) acknowledges that the latter was opposed to thought that privileges the category of the 'real' over that of the 'possible', for to do so 'would engage in a fetishism of the present that merely perpetuates the unquestioned power of capital and the state to foreclose political possibilities and to dominate everyday life'. As I have demonstrated, this would be consistent with a reading of Lefebvre as an open Marxist. However, in a footnote to an earlier article, Brenner (2000: 362, fn. 1) announces that 'the production of scale has been analysed effectively on the basis of other starting points, including regulation theory, the theory of uneven development, and neo-Gramscian state theory ... I believe that Lefebvre's theoretical framework can be fruitfully combined with each of the aforementioned methodologies'. This leads Brenner down a path of theoretical synthesis which culminates in the stated aim of the *New State Spaces* being to analyse the 'regulatory responses to the crisis of North Atlantic Fordism' (2004: 18). The result is distinctly structuralist-regulationist; methodologically, the economic and political spheres are situated in a relationship of 'mutual constitution' (2004: 25), echoing Jessop's binary of structure and struggle and the Gramscian 'integral state' (2004: 78-80). Brenner explicitly endorses the SRA (2004: 84-89), and a structuralist-regulationist logic is clearly evident in the conclusion that

within modern capitalism, statehood is configured in a geographically differentiated form; at the same time, as *state institutions are harnessed to regulate the uneven geographies of political-economic*

¹⁶ Brenner (1997; 2004) also uses Lefebvre (synthesised with David Harvey and Bob Jessop) to stress the dynamism and changeability of state-spatial configurations over time. Harvey (1996) adopts the notion of 'relative permanences' within capitalism, in an attempt to resist the temptation of reifying structures (as with his own theory of the 'spatial fix', for example).

life, they engage continuously in the production and transformation of places, regions, territories and scalar hierarchies. As *diverse social forces struggle to mobilise state institutions towards their own ends*, state space is continuously reconfigured, whether through explicit projects to reorganise the geographies of state territorial organisation and state intervention, *or as indirect outcomes of ongoing regulatory experiments and socio-political conflicts* (2004: 111, emphasis added).

This curious usage of Lefebvre's work in parallel with structuralist-regulationist logic is evident elsewhere in the associated literature. In *State Power*, Jessop implies that Lefebvre is to be read as a strategic-relational thinker, and as a complement to Poulantzas – a quintessential structuralist. With reference to the latter's influence upon thinking about 'national spatio-temporal matrices', Jessop (2008: 137) writes 'many of these ideas are developed in Lefebvre's analysis of the strategic selectivity and power relations inscribed within the abstract space of capitalist societies'. Jessop refers the reader to a passage in *The Production of Space*, the interpretation of which is, I would contend, moot.¹⁷

In seeking to transcend the spatial state centrism of orthodox globalisation studies by exploring the question of scale, the new state spaces literature runs the risk of substituting one form of state centrism for another; namely, the state-centrism of structuralism-regulationism. Lefebvre was, as I have shown, profoundly critical of such state-centrism; other open Marxists certainly would be, as explained in section one. Yet Lefebvre continues to be read as a strategic-relational thinker. How are we to account for this? It may be the case, of course, that Brenner and Jessop's own reading of Lefebvre's writings lends credence to thinking about the state spatiality in broadly structuralist-regulationist terms (see,

¹⁷ The open Marxist-sounding sentence 'the state was constituted as an imaginary and real, abstract-concrete "being"' (Lefebvre 1991/1974: 279) precedes the more 'structuralist' and moot – in terms of its meaning – assertion that 'even if, like Marx, one proves to one's own satisfaction that the state and its constitution are not independent of the relations of production, of classes and their contradictions, the fact remains that the state with its sovereignty rises above these factors and reserves the right to resolve contradictions by force'.

for example, Brenner 2000: 370-373).¹⁸ Also, it may be possible to locate moments within Lefebvre's work which lapse into an unqualified – perhaps, unreflexive – usage of structuralist-regulationist language.¹⁹ I do not, at present, have any definitive answers to these questions; and ultimately, these questions are interesting but irrelevant for my argument. It is my conviction, however, that *it is possible to derive a challenge to the structuralism-regulationism of the new state spaces literature from Lefebvre's writing on space, if it is justifiably read through an open Marxist lens*. The remainder of the paper will explain this process of derivation.

4. Space, State and Struggle: Lefebvre on Becoming Urban

Since Marx's death ... much has of course, changed in the world. But many things have remained the same, most notably in terms of social relations. There has been progress and regression. In order to understand these changes, we need to supplement Marx's theories and vocabulary (Lefebvre 1988: 78).

Before the challenge presented by Lefebvre's thinking about space can be explicated, it is necessary to demonstrate the continuities running through the work discussed in section two and his later work. Elden (2001: 2004a: 37), for example, has already taken issue with the misrepresentation of Lefebvre's method as regards space in Shields (1999) and Soja (1991), arguing that both overstate its 'postmodern' novelty and the extent to which it departs from Marx. In agreement, I

¹⁸ Elden (2004a: 215-222) provides an overview of the four un-translated volumes of *De l'Etat*, which Brenner frequently cites as being influential in this regard. Elden's reading further substantiates the problem of antinomy insofar as it clearly demarcates Lefebvre's state theory from both the inter-personalist instrumentalism of Miliband, and structuralism of Poulantzas (2004a: 217-218).

¹⁹ It may be important to note in passing certain inconsistencies in Lefebvre's writing. While in the PCF, for example, his writing was subject to both self- and party-censorship (Elden 2002: 89-92); see also Merrifield's (2005: 697, fn. 5) suspicion of a 'post '68 Althusserian *dérive*' in Lefebvre's *The Urban Revolution*.

suggest that Lefebvre adheres to the dialectical method explained in section 2, and thinks through his own (supplementary) determining concepts in a practically reflexive way. I have attempted to schematically present a commensurable reading of the movement of contradiction using respective categories from Hegel, Marx, and Lefebvre in figure 1. I will refer to Lefebvre's concepts (in bold in figure 1) in the course of this section. The section proceeds by clarifying exactly how Lefebvre supplements Marx; then it outlines his general thesis regarding the production of space, before exploring in more detail his line of argument concerning urbanisation, the state, and class struggle.

Figure 1: The Movement of Contradiction: Hegel, Marx, and Lefebvre

| FIRST TERM (assertion; concept) | SECOND TERM (negation) | THIRD TERM <i>(Transcending; realisation of the Becoming; negation of the negation; disalienation)</i> |
|--|--|--|
| <i>Becoming; determination; movement; flux (TIME)</i> | | |
| Being Quality Subject Content Use-Value Labour Oeuvre To inhabit Difference | <i>Suspension (Aufhebung) of the first term in and against the second; mode of existence-in-denial (SPACE)</i> | Nothingness Quantity Object Form Exchange Value Capital Product Habitat Homogeneity |
| | | Hegel: transcendence as Philosophy (Mind); the actuality of the ethical Idea (the State) Marx: transcendence through Praxis; the realisation of Philosophy; the withering away of the State; Total Man Lefebvre: transcendence through (spatialised) Praxis; the realisation of the Urban; the Right to the City; <i>autogestion</i> |

The continuities of thought from Hegel and Marx to Lefebvre are firstly evident in the latter's long-term preoccupation with 'everyday life' (*la vie quotidienne*). The notion of 'production' in Marx is central to understanding Lefebvre's concern here:

According to Marx's early works ... production is not merely the making of products: the term signifies on the one hand the 'spiritual' production, that is to say creations (including social time and space),

and on the other material production or the making of things; it also signifies the self-production of the 'human being' in the process of historical self-development, which involves the production of social relations. Finally, in its fullest sense, the terms embraces *re-production*, not only biological ... but the material reproduction of the tools of production, of technical instruments and of social relations into the bargain; until they are shattered by de-structuralism, a society's social relations remain constant, their reproduction being the outcome of a complex impulse rather than of inertia or passivity; this impulse ... this *praxis* and *poiesis* does not take place in the higher spheres of a society (state, scholarship, 'culture') but in everyday life (Lefebvre 2000/1971: 30-31).

The dialectic of everyday life therefore builds upon Marx's critique of alienation, yet broadens its parameters beyond the critique of political economy, which hinges on the question of (labour-) time (see Bonefeld 2007a). 'Workers do not only have a life in the workplace', announces Lefebvre (1988: 78), 'they have a social life, family life, political life; they have experiences outside the domain of labour'. Lefebvre finds the temporal focus in Marx's *Capital* understandable, given the context of rampant industrialisation in which it was written, however for Lefebvre 'dialectics allows for the analysis of becoming, that is to say, of time, *more or less connected to space*' (Lefebvre 1988: 86, emphasis added).

The idea that the dialectic of 'everyday life' can explain the survival of capitalism into the late twentieth century – as well as illuminate the role of formal logic, modelling, and social planning as ideology – leads Lefebvre (1973/1971: 21) to an important thesis: 'capitalism has found itself able to attenuate (if not resolve) its internal contradictions for a century, and consequently, in the hundred years since the writing of *Capital*, it succeeded in achieving "growth". We cannot calculate at what price, but we do know the means: *by occupying space, by producing a space*'. Capitalism, in short, produces its own (urban) space. This thesis can be understood firstly in terms that parallel the work of David Harvey (1999/1982) regarding the way in which the built environment provides capital with new investment opportunities:

Space as a whole enters into the modernised mode of capitalist production: it is utilised to produce surplus value. The ground, the air, and even the light enter into both the productive forces and the products. The urban fabric, with its multiple networks of communication and exchange, is part of the means of production. The city and its various installations (ports, train stations, etc) are part of capital (Lefebvre 1979: 287; cf. Harvey 1999/1982).

But the thesis also builds more directly upon Marx's method of critique, evident in *Capital*. For Lefebvre argues that the process of industrialisation upon which Marx focused his studies has been subsumed within a process of urbanisation. Time understood in the abstract as concerning work, the production of things and of surplus value, has been 'reduced to constraints of space' – circumscribed within the '*urban form*': 'the city is understood as (a) a (spatial) object, (b) mediation (between near and distant order), (c) a work (similar to the work of art, formed by a group). Form unifies these three aspects of the city' (Lefebvre 2003/1970: 194, fn. 6.1). This form has a content, as explained below. Further, the dialectical notion of social relations *becoming urban* takes into account the wider sense of 'production', as explained above, and hints at Lefebvre's regressive-progressive method at work:

Marx did not show (and in his time he could not) that urbanisation and the *urban* contain the *meaning* of industrialisation. He did not see that industrial production implied the urbanisation of society, and that the mastery of industrial potentials required specific knowledge concerning urbanisation. Industrial production, after a certain *growth*, produces urbanisation, providing it with conditions, and possibilities. The problematic is displaced and becomes that of urban *development* (Lefebvre 1996/1968: 130).

This thesis requires further explanation before its analytical and political implications can be explored. The relationship of space to this process of urbanisation is, for Lefebvre, dialectical. Lefebvre (1979: 292) writes that 'although space is not analysed in *Capital*, certain concepts, such as exchange value and use value, today apply to space'. In terms that echo

Marx's observation that capital is not a thing but a social relation (Marx 1976: 165), Lefebvre recognises that '(social) space is a (social) product' (Lefebvre 1991/1974: 26). Historically, Lefebvre argues, we can identify societies that produced an 'absolute space': 'religious and political in character, [it] was a product of the bonds of consanguinity, soil and language, but out of it evolved a space which was relativised and historical. Not that absolute space disappeared in the process; rather it survived as the bedrock of historical space and the basis of representational spaces (religious, magical and political symbolisms)' (1991/1974: 48). Through the progressive-regressive method, Lefebvre identifies the absolute space of pre-industrial age cities and city-states as '*ouvres*': 'they are centres of social and political life where not only wealth is accumulated, but knowledge (*connaissances*), techniques, and *ouvres* (works of art, monuments)'. Such observations are important for Lefebvre as they are to be understood dialectically in relation to relativised '*abstract space*', a product of capitalism specifically. Abstract space is deliberately intended to parallel that of homogenising abstract labour in Marx's *Capital*.²⁰ It is a negating concept: 'the formal and quantified abstract space negates all differences, those that come from nature and history as well as those that come from the body, ages, sexes, and ethnicities'. The abstract space of capitalism is realised through the urban form, in much the same way as abstract labour is realised through the wage form for Marx. The urban form denies all differential labour *and space* in an internal and '*centralising*' relationship: 'piles of objects and products in warehouses, mounds of fruit in the marketplace, crowds, pedestrians, goods of various kinds, juxtaposed, superimposed, accumulated – this is what makes the urban urban ... Different things occur one after another and do not exist separately but according to their differences' (Lefebvre 2003/1970: 116-117). 'There is, in short, 'no urban

²⁰ Cf. *Capital*: 'When they thus assume the shapes of values, commodities strip off every trace of their natural and original use-value, and of the particular kind of useful labour to which they owe their creation, in order to pupate into the homogenous social materialisation of undifferentiated human labour' (Marx 1976: 204).

reality without a centre, without a gathering together of all that can be born into space and that can be produced in it, without an encounter, actual or possible, of all "objects" and "subjects" (Lefebvre 1996/1973: 195). Yet despite this intrinsic centralisation, and despite the urban being a product of human ingenuity and sociality, 'citizens' are themselves excluded from it – forced to live segregated and banal everyday lives: 'isolated from the city, the proletariat will end its sense of the *oeuvre*' (Lefebvre 1996/1968: 77). Often in his work on space, Lefebvre differentiates between the concept *to inhabit* – which in pre-industrial times meant 'to take part in a social life, a community, village or city' (1996/1968: 76) – with the more formal and closed category *habitat* which is related to the urban form and which 'is brought to its purest form by state bureaucracy' (1996/1968: 79). For Lefebvre, nowhere was this constraining and alienated mode of everyday life within the urban habitat more evident than in the state-planned housing projects erected in many European cities in the post-War period, prompting him to explain:

The new proletariat? The 'new working class'? They do not meet in the highly technological industries but in middle-income housing projects, and new towns and neighbourhoods. This proletariat no longer experiences former wants or the old scars of the proletarian condition. It is housed, fed, entertained. Economists may view this 'standard of living' satisfactory. It satisfies no one ... The working class submits reluctantly to this condition of need and non-participation. Humiliation and the lack of freedom resulting from the presence (and absence) of the centres of decision-making and social life are keenly felt' (Lefebvre 1969/1968: 99).

However, in true dialectical fashion, the concept of abstract space carries within it a certain determination; that is, 'it relates negatively to something it carries within itself and which seeks to emerge from it: a *differential* space-time' (Lefebvre 1991/1974: 50, emphasis). For Lefebvre, 'urban space-time, as soon as we stop defining it in terms of industrial rationality – its project of homogenisation – appears as *differential*' (Lefebvre 2003/1970: 37). In short, 'abstract space *is not* homogenous; it simply *has* homogeneity as its goal, its orientation, its

"lens" (1991/1974: 287). The key to understanding contradictory abstract space for Lefebvre is 'the body'; a category of being, 'it will not allow itself to be dismembered without a protest, nor to be divided into fragments, deprived of its rhythms, reduced to its catalogued needs, to images and specialisations. The body ... is irreducible and subversive. It rejects the reproduction of relations which deprive it and crush it' (Lefebvre 1973/1971: 89). The body therefore precludes, in theory and in practice, the complete triumph of centralisation over difference and gives substance to urbanisation as an open category (a process of Becoming). Abstract space conflicts with 'differential space', which 'is different because it celebrates particularity – both bodily and experiential' (Merrifield 2000: 176). Urbanisation is therefore to be understood dialectically, as a process of Becoming in which 'centrality' (homogeneity) and 'polycentrality' (fragmentation, difference) mediate each other in a relation of determinate existence fixed within the urban form (Lefebvre 2003/1970: 119). Dialectically speaking, 'spatial *Aufhebung*, like its temporal variant, negates, preserves, and transcends' (Dimendberg 1998: 35). 'Urban society provides a goal and meaning for industrialisation only to the extent that it is engendered by it, encompasses it, and directs it towards some other thing. It is no longer a metaphysical conception, naively historical, of finality' (Lefebvre 2003/1970: 67). In dialectical terms, 'space thus understood is both abstract and concrete in character: abstract inasmuch as it has no existence save by virtue of the exchangeability of all its component parts, and concrete inasmuch as it is socially real and as such localised. This is a space, therefore, that is homogenous yet at the same time broken up into fragments' (Lefebvre 1991/1974: 341-342).

For Lefebvre, the dialectical illumination of the concept difference *within and against* the centralising urban form points strategy to the critique of 'urbanism' as an ideological form of 'representational space'²¹ and of 'planning' as class practice: 'the physician of modern society sees himself as the physician of a sick social space ... The cure? It is *coherence* ... he

²¹ This completes a dialectical triad in *The Production of Space* between *abstract*, *representational* and *differential* space.

will systematise the *logic of the habitat* underlying the disorder and apparent incoherence' (Lefebvre 1996/1968: 82-83). This critique demands nothing less than *métaphilosophie*; the 'fragmentary sciences' (sociology, economics, linguistics, planning etc) cannot but approach the urban problem partially and therefore ideologically (Lefebvre 2003/1970: 53-76; cf. Lefebvre 2003/1971: 38) insofar as the institutionalisation of modern academic disciplines only further systematises knowledge and fosters model-building, thereby relegating 'into shadow time and becoming' (Lefebvre 1996/1968: 99). 'To clear a path, we have to destroy the models' (Lefebvre 2003/1970: 163). In contrast, Lefebvre's *métaphilosophie* insists upon the social constitution of the category 'urban': 'in this way the *urban* is more or less the *oeuvre* of its citizens instead of imposing itself upon them as a system, as an already closed book' (1996/1968: 117). Lefebvre is thus able to relate difference to class struggle – against the systematising logic of 'planning' and in a distinctly open Marxist way:

Today more than ever the class struggle is inscribed in space. Indeed, it is that struggle alone which prevents abstract space from taking over the whole planet and papering over all differences. Only the class struggle has the capacity to differentiate, to generate differences which are not intrinsic to economic growth *qua* strategy, 'logic' or 'system' – that is to say, differences which are neither induced by nor acceptable to that growth (Lefebvre 1991/1974: 55).

While Lefebvre is deeply critical of the formal logic which sees planning as a rational means of curing 'sick social space' in general, he is certain of where chief responsibility for suppressing the Becoming of a dis-alienated, differential urban society lies: in the state. The modern state has, for Lefebvre, assumed ever-increasing responsibility for circumscribing and cohering the process of urbanisation – a mediating counter-tendency Lefebvre terms '*étatisation*' (see Elden 2004a: 224).

The primary role of the modern state is to prevent the collapse of the edifice which extends from the labour force to the political caste – to maintain a hierarchised system of places, functions, and institutions.

*The process of reproduction does not become functionally autonomous; it is actualised in a space, political space, the condition for generalised reproduction (Lefebvre 2002/1978: 94, emphasis added).*²²

According to Lefebvre this process led to the consolidation of a State Mode of Production (*le Mode de Production Étatique*, or SMP), on both sides of the iron curtain by the 1970s – a form of state which exhibits a ‘rationality bordering on the absurd but excelling in the manipulation of people and things’ (Lefebvre 2000/1971: 62). In the first instance, then, Lefebvre’s writing on the SMP appears pessimistic:

The State appropriates some portion, or even the entirety, of the social surplus ... Such a State raises itself above society and penetrates it to its depths, all the way into everyday life and behaviour. It has several dimensions: (a) managerial (*gestionnaire*) and administrative; (b) the power to protect (*sécurisante*); and (c) the power to kill (*mortelle*) – by means of repression, the monopoly of violence, the army and military spending, strategies implying the possibility of war, and so forth ... Homogenising, identitarian, the state crushes that which resists it; it makes differences disappear ... It reproduces itself in reproducing the relations of domination; it has at its disposal an unlimited power to constrain its citizens; it can therefore paralyse all their initiatives (Lefebvre 2001/1979: 774).

Lefebvre’s invective against the SMP is consistent with his broadening of Marx’s notion of production to encompass everyday life, and is related to the general process of urbanisation understood as society becoming urban. This dialectic of social space therefore indicates the internalisation

²² Lefebvre then embellishes: ‘The latter entails: 1) biological (demographic) reproduction; 2) the reproduction of the labour force (families grouped in “housing projects” or in working-class neighbourhoods, suburban fringes (*banlieues*), etc; 3) the reproduction of the means of production (equipment, technology, resources); 4) the reproduction of the relations of production (which the company is no longer able to ensure or guarantee) and the relations of domination’ (Lefebvre 2001/1978: 94).

of its contradictions by the state-form, understood as a mode of existence-in-denial. 'The space [urbanisation] creates is political' (2003/1970: 180), and Lefebvre understands state strategy in relation to the urban form in *essentially negative* terms:

The State can only prevent the urban from taking shape. The state has to control the urban phenomenon, not to bring it to fruition but to retard its development, to push it in the direction of institutions that extend to society as a whole, through exchange and the market, the types of organisation and management found in the enterprise, institutions developed through during periods of growth, where the emphasis is given to quantitative (quantifiable) objectives. But the urban can only establish and serve 'habiting' by reversing the state order and the strategy that organises space globally, through constraint and homogenisation, thereby absorbing the subordinate levels of the urban and habiting (2003/1970: 180).

Yet, despite this ostensibly pessimistic analysis, Lefebvre persists in revealing the possibilities inherent within this dialectical process of urbanisation-*étatisation*. Having established the problem of the urban form and the contradiction of abstract space, Lefebvre issues his demand for a right to the city – 'the right not to be excluded from centrality and its movement' (Lefebvre 2003/1970: 150). This demand is issued in dialectical recognition of the contradictions of the SMP – principally, that in centralising it cannot help but bring about polycentrality, the further differentiation of society albeit in an alienated urban form or habitat. Lefebvre therefore expresses a keen interest in the concept of '*autogestion*' – roughly translated as 'self-management'.²³ This is defined, by Lefebvre 2003/1990: 252), as 'knowledge and control (at the limit) by a group – a company, a locality, an area or region – over the conditions

²³ See Brenner (2001b) for a background discussion of the idea of *autogestion* within the French Left from the 1950s onwards. The idea was popular among members of the Situationist International (see, for example, Veneigem 1981/1969), with whom Lefebvre was involved in the 1960s. Both Lefebvre and

governing its existence and its survival through change. Through self-management, these social groups are able to influence their own reality'. Elsewhere he adds, 'each time a social group (generally the productive workers) refuses to accept passively its conditions of existence, of life or survival, each time such a group forces itself not only to understand but to master its own conditions of existence, *autogestion* is occurring' (Lefebvre 2001/1979: 779). Put simply then, Lefebvre saw a disalienated urban society being realised through the self-management strategies of all people and at every level of everyday life:

The concept of *autogestion* does not provide a model, does not trace a line. It points to a way, and thus to a strategy. The strategy must exclude manoeuvres and manipulations that render practice illusory; this strategy must therefore prevent the monopolisation of the word and the concept by institutions that transform them into fiction. In addition, the strategy must concretise *autogestion* and extend it to all levels and sectors. This perpetual struggle for *autogestion* is the class struggle (Lefebvre 2001/1979: 780).

The strategic goal of this struggle is, for Lefebvre, necessarily the same as it was for Marx: the withering away of the state. This 'gets a new lease on life when placed in the context of the following insight: state management of space implies a logic of stability that is both destructive and self-destructive' (Lefebvre 1991/1974: 387). The only alternative open for the working class, according to Lefebvre, is to demand the right to difference.

Referring in the main to the four volumes of *De l'Etat*, Elden (2004a: 226) concludes of Lefebvre's writings on the state that they stand in clear opposition to both instrumentalist and structuralist state theories. 'Can the state be harnessed to progressive political goals?' he asks rhetorically, only to reply: 'Lefebvre's answer is that only a radical rethink of the state, and essentially a wholesale removal of its power, is sufficient to achieve this'. Lefebvre reminds us time and again that 'the state' (a 'concrete-abstraction' – see 2004a: 220) has conceptual validity only insofar as it is

the Situationists are considered to have influenced in some way the events of May 1968 in France.

internally related to capitalism as an actually existing system (cf. Bonefeld 2007b). By identifying *autogestion* as 'orienting' us to a path towards disalienation (Lefebvre 1978: 295), Lefebvre is, like Marx before him envisioning a possible future beyond capitalism:

instead of the state being above society ... the state will become dependent upon it. This is the dictatorship of the proletariat, the widening and deepening of democracy. It will lead to the withering away of the state (Elden 2004a: 229; cf. Lefebvre 1968/1966: 183).

This is not simply a grand, normative political posture; it is wholly consistent with Lefebvre's method of critical thought. In other words, Elden recognises, and I am of course in agreement, that Lefebvre does not posit the state as a closed system, standing in an external relationship with urbanisation. Rather, it is internally related to this process and assumes responsibility for the suppression of differential or 'sick' space through its ideological and concrete manipulation of everyday life and its spaces. This therefore recognises the essentially negative role of state management (*pace* structuralism-regulationism). Moreover, as with the time-focused open Marxist understanding of the state-form as a mode of existence of an essential social struggle that it cannot contain, this approach recognises that the urban form cannot empty itself of its subversive human, bodily content, and in spite of the 'rationality' of planning and state strategy. To realise the right to difference in a disalienated urban society therefore necessarily implies conceptualising the state as an open category.

5. Conclusion: Lefebvre's Challenge

The term 'open Marxism' describes not a 'school' of thought but a particular way of thinking that can be attributed to a variety of writers, working in different times and places. It is more a tradition, and one that deliberately leaves scope for original, heterodox thought. In this paper I have demonstrated how we can read the work of Henri Lefebvre through an open Marxist lens; that is to say, his work resists dogmatism or the allure of fetishised, closed forms of thought that allow for the

development of generally applicable frameworks, categories and models to be developed for largely analytical, affirmative purposes. Like other writers in the tradition his theory is resolutely critical, he engages in negative critique. Like Marx, Lefebvre recognises that 'human beings are their own self-creations: they create themselves' (Lefebvre 1988: 87). While 'other conceptions of the world take account either of the relationship of human beings to creative nature or of their relation with some transcendence', Marx and Lefebvre consider the relationship of human beings in their social relations as one of 'a nucleus and centre of self-creation' (1988: 87). Lefebvre (2003/1970: 101) says of his own work's relationship to Marx: 'I have added a few elements to the theory of the upside-down world that strengthen the mission to reverse this world and complete the Marxist ideal of a revolution in the system of industrial production with the addition of a planned urban revolution'. With true practical reflexivity, Lefebvre's writing on space therefore seeks to continue the project of critique. 'One must turn this world upside down', writes Lefebvre (1996/1968: 91), 'the meeting of the rational and the real will happen in another society'. In summary, even when Lefebvre concluded that Marx was indeed premature in his depiction of the demise of capitalism, and when he concluded that the state had succeeded in penetrating every aspect of everyday life, he never abandoned 'the possible'. Even in the context of the SMP, Lefebvre could detect the real movement of contradiction through his *métaphilosophie*, pointing out the path of Becoming toward a 'real' but not-yet-existing, differential urban society.

In recognition of this commitment on Lefebvre's part, I have sought to draw attention to a potential problem of antinomy in the New State Spaces literature and therefore the extent to which Lefebvre's work challenges this literature in important methodological respects. For, as long as Lefebvre is unproblematically presented as an interlocutor in the development of this essentially structuralist-regulationist literature, there is the risk of occluding the negative, critical theoretical thrust of his life's work. Whilst the New State Spaces approach deserves credit for maintaining a commitment to some form of relational thinking, and in so doing highlighting crucial shortcomings of the mainstream globalisation

literature, it does exhibit its own shortcomings, from an open Marxist perspective, and in keeping with its own structuralist-regulationist state centrism. The differences between the closed theorisation of the latter, compared with the open thought of the former, may well appear trivial and intramural to some Marxists and most non-Marxists. Put simply, then, at the very least we can caution against the tendency in the literature on the new political economy of scale to afford primary analytical importance to state restructuring and at the expense of 'class struggle', however defined: 'current (re)scaling of political-economy ... is not a 'structural' feature of the epoch but very much open to struggle' (Gough 2004: 206). But more importantly, and however subtle the theoretical differences between say the regulation approach and open Marxism may ostensibly appear, the political significance of one particular reading of a thinker like Lefebvre when compared with another can, strictly speaking, be immeasurable. For, as is suggested in the opening to the *Right to the City*, one approach serves to 'close off reflection, to block off horizon', while the other serves to 'open up through thought and action towards possibilities by showing the horizon and the road'. Or, to put it another way, one's 'acceptance of horizons amounts to acceptance of their inevitability' (Bonfeld, Gunn and Psychopedis 1992: xii), while the other's commitment to negative critique points to the endless possibilities inherent in Marx's observation that 'all social life is essentially practical. All mysteries ... find their rational solution in human practice and in the comprehension of this practice' (Marx 1975/1888: 423).

This paper has sought to contribute in a constructive manner to 'further discussion and debate regarding Lefebvre's complex, contested and multifaceted legacies for contemporary times' (Brenner & Elden 2001: 767). In a way, it suggests that Lefebvre's own work on space presents us all with a challenge; that is, how to develop a critique of space which does not substitute an open theory of the space of political economy with a closed theory of the political economy of the *regulation* of space. In discussing the contemporary reading of Lefebvre's work, the paper has deliberately not hinted at whether or not Lefebvre's writings on space, urbanisation and the state – which were mostly written over three decades ago – continue to be valid. Having hopefully cleared the way for

an open Marxist reading of Lefebvre's work, we can perhaps subsequently embark upon a project which thinks through contemporary political economy in a 'Lefebvrian way'. Perhaps this implies a fundamental rethink of how we approach the question of space as a social product today. For, 'the *truth of space*', concludes Lefebvre (1991/1974: 398-399), 'ties space on the one hand to social practice, and on the other hand to concepts which, though worked out theoretically by philosophy, in fact transcend philosophy as such precisely by virtue of their theory with practice ... We are concerned, in other words, with theory beyond system-building'.²⁴

²⁴ NOTE TO TPWG: I had intended to set out some propositions for lines of inquiry into contemporary political economy here building upon the thesis summarised in section four. I haven't had the time unfortunately, and the paper is already approaching 12,000 words in length, but would be interested to discuss this with you all at our meeting.

References

- Adorno, Theodor W. (2007/1966) *Negative Dialectics*, translated by E. B. Ashton (New York: Continuum).
- Althusser, Louis & Étienne Balibar (1998/1968) *Reading Capital*, translated by Ben Brewster (London: Verso).
- Backhaus, Hans-Georg (2004) 'Some Aspects of Marx's Concept of Critique in the Context of his Economic-Philosophical Theory', in *Human Dignity: Social Autonomy and the Critique of Capitalism*, edited by Werner Bonefeld & Kosmas Psychopedis (Aldershot: Ashgate).
- Bieler, Andreas, Werner Bonefeld, Peter Burnham & Adam David Morton (2006) *Global Restructuring, State, Capital and Labour: Contesting Neo-Gramscian Perspectives* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan).
- Bonefeld, Werner (1993a) *The Recomposition of the British State during the 1980s* (Aldershot: Dartmouth).
- Bonefeld, Werner (1993b) 'Crisis of Theory: Bob Jessop's Theory of Capitalist Reproduction', *Capital & Class*, 50: 25-47.
- Bonefeld, Werner (1995) 'Money, Equality and Exploitation: An Interpretation of Marx's Treatment of Money', in *Global Capital, National State, and the Politics of Money*, edited by Werner Bonefeld & John Holloway (London: Macmillan).
- Bonefeld, Werner (2001) 'Kapital and its Subtitle: A Note on the Meaning of Critique', *Capital & Class*, 75: 53-64.
- Bonefeld, Werner (2002) 'State, Revolution, and Self-Determination', in *What Is to Be Done? New Times and the Anniversary of a Question*, edited by Werner Bonefeld & Sergio Tischler (London: Ashgate).
- Bonefeld, Werner (2004) 'On Postone's Courageous but Unsuccessful Attempt to Banish the Class Antagonism from the Critique of Political Economy', *Historical Materialism*, 12, 3: 103-124.
- Bonefeld, Werner (2007a) 'Primitive Accumulation and Capitalist Accumulation: Economic Categories and Social Constitution', draft working paper, CSE Trans-Pennine Working Group, downloaded on 7 January 2007 from <http://www.socialsciences.manchester.ac.uk/disciplines/politics/research/hmrg/activities/documents/Bonefeld.pdf>.
- Bonefeld, Werner (2007b) 'Praxis y constitucionalidad: Notes sobre Adorno', in *Negatividad y revolucion: Theodor W. Adorno y la Política*, edited by John Holloway, Fernando Matamoros & Sergio Tischler (Buenos Aires & Puebla: Ediciones Herramienta & Universidad Autonoma de Puebla).
- Bonefeld, Werner, Richard Gunn & Kosmas Psychopedis (1992) 'Introduction', in *Open Marxism Volume I: Dialectics and History*, edited by Werner Bonefeld, Richard Gunn & Kosmas Psychopedis (London: Pluto).
- Bonefeld, Werner & John Holloway (eds.) (1991) *Post-Fordism and Social Form: A Marxist Debate on the Post-Fordist State* (London: Macmillan).
- Brenner, Neil & Stuart Elden (2001) 'Henri Lefebvre in Contexts: An Introduction', *Antipode*, 33, 5: 763-768.
- Brenner, Neil (1997) 'Global, Fragmented, Hierarchical: Henri Lefebvre's Geographies of Globalisation', *Public Culture*, 10, 1: 135-167.
- Brenner, Neil (1998) 'Between fixity and motion: accumulation, territorial organization and the historical geography of spatial scales', *Environment and Planning D: Space and Society*, 16, 5: 459-481.

- Brenner, Neil (1999) 'Beyond state-centrism? Space, territoriality and geographical scale in globalization studies', *Theory and Society*, 28, 2: 39-78.
- Brenner, Neil (2000) 'The Urban Question as a Scale Question: Reflections on Henri Lefebvre, Urban Theory and the Politics of Scale', *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, 24, 2: 361-378.
- Brenner, Neil (2001a) 'The limits to scale? Methodological reflections on scalar structuration', *Progress in Human Geography*, 25, 4: 591-614.
- Brenner, Neil (2003) 'Metropolitan Institutional Reform and the Rescaling of State Space in Contemporary Western Europe', *European Urban Regional Studies*, 10, 4: 297-324.
- Brenner, Neil (2004) *New State Spaces: Urban Governance and the Rescaling of Statehood* (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
- Burnham, Peter (1990) *The Political Economy of Postwar Reconstruction* (London: Macmillan).
- Clarke, Simon (ed.) (1991a) *The State Debate* (London: Macmillan)
- Clarke, Simon (1991b) 'Overaccumulation, Class Struggle and the Regulation Approach', in *Post Fordism and Social Form: A Marxist Debate on Post-Fordism*, edited by Werner Bonefeld & John Holloway (London: Macmillan).
- Dimendberg, Edward (1998) 'Henri Lefebvre on Abstract Space', in *Philosophy and Geography II: The Production of Public Space*, edited by Andrew Light & Jonathan M. Smith (Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield).
- Elden, Stuart (2002) 'Through the Eyes of the Fantastic: Lefebvre, Rabelais and Intellectual History', *Historical Materialism*, 10, 4: 89-111.
- Elden, Stuart (2004a) *Understanding Henri Lefebvre: Theory and the Possible* (London: Continuum).
- Elden, Stuart (2004b) 'Between Marx and Heidegger: Politics, Philosophy and Lefebvre's *The Production of Space*', *Antipode*, 36, 1: 86-105.
- Elden, Stuart (2006) 'Some Are Born Posthumously: The French Afterlife of Henri Lefebvre', *Historical Materialism*, 14, 4: 185-202.
- Gough, Jamie (2004) 'Changing scale as changing class relations: variety and contradiction in the politics of scale', *Political Geography*, 23: 185-211.
- Gunn, Richard (1991) 'Marxism, Metatheory and Critique', in *Post Fordism and Social Form: A Marxist Debate on Post-Fordism*, edited by Werner Bonefeld & John Holloway (London: Macmillan).
- Gunn, Richard (1992) 'Against Historical Materialism: Marxism as First-Order Discourse', in *Open Marxism II: Theory and Practice*, edited by Werner Bonefeld, Richard Gunn & Kosmas Psychopedis (London: Pluto).
- Harvey, David (1999/1982) *The Limits to Capital* (London: Verso).
- Holloway, John (1991) 'Capital is Class Struggle (And Polar Bears are not Cuddly)', in *Post Fordism and Social Form: A Marxist Debate on Post-Fordism*, edited by Werner Bonefeld & John Holloway (London: Macmillan).
- Jay, Martin (1984) *Marxism and Totality: The Adventures of a Concept from Lukács to Habermas* (Cambridge: Polity).
- Jessop, Bob (1990) *State Theory: putting capitalist states in their place* (Cambridge: Polity).

- Jessop, Bob (1991) 'Polar Bears and Class Struggle: Much Less than a Self-Criticism', in *Post Fordism and Social Form: A Marxist Debate on Post-Fordism*, edited by Werner Bonefeld & John Holloway (London: Macmillan).
- Jessop, Bob (2001) 'Capitalism, the Regulation Approach, and Critical Realism', in *Critical Realism and Marxism*, edited by Andrew Brown, Steve Fleetwood & John Michael Roberts (London: Routledge).
- Jessop, Bob (2002) *The Future of the Capitalist State* (London: Polity).
- Jessop, Bob (2003) 'From Thatcherism to New Labour: Neo-Liberalism, Workfarism, and Labour Market Regulation', on-line research paper, Department of Sociology, Lancaster University, downloaded on 16 January 2008 from <http://www.comp.lancs.ac.uk/sociology/soc131rj.pdf>.
- Jessop, Bob (2004) 'Recent Social and Urban Change: Principles of Periodization and Their application on the Current Period', in *Urban Mutations: Periodization, Scale and Mobility*, edited by Tom Nielsen, Niels Albertsen & Peter Memmersam (Aarhus: Arkitektiskolens Forlag).
- Jessop, Bob (2005) 'Critical Realism and the Strategic Relational Approach', *New Formations*, 56: 40-53.
- Jessop, Bob (2008) *State Power: A Strategic-Relational Approach* (Cambridge: Polity Press).
- Jessop, Bob & Ngai-Ling Sum (2006) *The Regulation Approach and Beyond: Putting Capitalist Economies in Their Place* (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar).
- Jessop, Bob, Neil Brenner & Martin Jones (forthcoming) 'Theorizing Socio-Spatial Relations', *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space*.
- Lefebvre, Henri (1968/1940) *Dialectical Materialism*, translated by John Sturrock (London: Cape Editions).
- Lefebvre, Henri (1968/1966) *The Sociology of Marx*, translated by Norbert Guterman (London: Allen Lane, The Penguin Press).
- Lefebvre, Henri (1969/1968) *The Explosion: Marxism and the French Upheaval*, translated by Alfred Ehrenfeld (New York: Monthly Review Press).
- Lefebvre, Henri (1975/1947) *Lógica Formal, Lógica Dialéctica*, Spanish translation by Esther Benitez-Eiroa (Madrid: Siglo XXI de España Editors SA).
- Lefebvre, Henri (1976/1973) *The Survival of Capitalism: Reproduction of the Relations of Production* (London: Allison & Busby).
- Lefebvre, Henri (1979) 'Space: Social Product and Use Value', in *Critical Sociology: European Perspectives*, edited and translated by J. W. Freiberg (New York: Irvington Publishers).
- Lefebvre, Henri (1988) 'Toward a Leftist Cultural Politics: Remarks Occasioned by the Centenary of Marx's Death', translated by David Reifman, in *Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture*, edited by Cary Nelson & Lawrence Grossberg (Urbana: University of Illinois Press).
- Lefebvre, Henri (1991/1974) *The Production of Space*, translated by Donald Nicholson-Smith (Oxford: Blackwell).
- Lefebvre, Henri (1995/1962) *Introduction to Modernity*, translated by John Moore (London: Verso).
- Lefebvre, Henri (1996/1968) *The Right to the City*, in *Writings on Cities*, translated and edited by Eleonore Kaufman and Elizabeth Lebas (Oxford: Blackwell).

- Lefebvre, Henri (1996/1973) *Space and Politics*, in *Writings on Cities*, translated and edited by Eleonore Kaufman and Elizabeth Lebas (Oxford: Blackwell).
- Lefebvre, Henri (2000/1971) *Everyday Life in the Modern World*, translated by Sacha Rabinovitch, London: Athlone.
- Lefebvre, Henri (2001/1979) 'Comments on a New State Form', translated by Victoria Johnson & Neil Brenner, *Antipode*, 33, 5: 769-781.
- Lefebvre, Henri (2002/1978) 'Space and the State', in *State/Space: A Reader*, edited by Neil Brenner, Bob Jessop, Martin Jones & Gordon Macleod, translation of chapter 5 of *De l'état IV: Les contradictions de l'état moderne* by Alexandra Kowalski-Hodges, Neil Brenner, Aaron Passell & Bob Jessop (Oxford: Blackwell).
- Lefebvre, Henri (2003/1970) *The Urban Revolution*, translated by Roberto Bononno, Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press.
- Lefebvre, Henri (2003/1971) 'Beyond Structuralism', in *Henri Lefebvre: Key Writings*, edited by Stuart Elden, Elizabeth Lebas & Eleonore Kofman (London: Continuum).
- Lefebvre, Henri (2003/1980) 'Triads and Diads', in *Henri Lefebvre: Key Writings*, edited by Stuart Elden, Elizabeth Lebas & Eleonore Kofman (London: Continuum).
- Lefebvre, Henri (2003/1982) 'Twelve Theses on Logic and Dialectic', in *Henri Lefebvre: Key Writings*, edited by Stuart Elden, Elizabeth Lebas & Eleonore Kofman (London: Continuum).
- Lefebvre, Henri (2003/1986) 'Becoming and the Historical', in *Henri Lefebvre: Key Writings*, edited by Stuart Elden, Elizabeth Lebas & Eleonore Kofman (London: Continuum).
- Lefebvre, Henri (2003/1990) 'From the Social Pact to the Contract of Citizenship', in *Henri Lefebvre: Key Writings*, edited by Stuart Elden, Elizabeth Lebas & Eleonore Kofman (London: Continuum).
- Lefebvre, Henri (2004/1992) *Rhythmanalysis: Space, Time and Everyday Life*, translated by Stuart Elden & Gerald Moore (London: Continuum).
- MacLeod, Gordon (2001) 'New Regionalism Reconsidered: Globalization and the Remaking of Political Economic Space', *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, 25, 4: 804-829.
- MacLeod, Gordon & Mark Goodwin (1999) 'Space, scale and state strategy: rethinking urban and regional governance', *Progress in Human Geography*, 23, 4: 503-527.
- Marston, Sallie A. (2000) 'The social construction of scale', *Progress in Human Geography*, 24, 2: 219-242.
- Marx, Karl (1975/1888) 'Appendix A: Concerning Feuerbach' in *Marx: Early Writings*, translated by Rodney Livingstone & Gregor Benton (Harmondsworth: Penguin).
- Marx, Karl (1976/1867) *Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, Volume One*, translated by Ben Fowkes (Harmondsworth: Penguin).
- Merrifield, Andy (2000) 'Henri Lefebvre: A Socialist in Space', in *Thinking Space*, edited by Mike Crang & Nigel Thrift (London: Routledge).
- Merrifield, Andy (2005) 'Metropolitan birth pangs: Reflections on Lefebvre's *The Urban Revolution* (Review Essay)', *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, 29, 3: 693-702.

- Merrifield, Andy (2006) *Henri Lefebvre: A Critical Introduction* (London: Routledge).
- Poster, Mark (1975) *Existential Marxism in Postwar France: From Sartre to Althusser* (Princeton: Princeton University Press).
- Psychopedis, Kosmas (2004) 'Social Critique and the Logic of Revolution: From Kant to Marx and from Marx to Us', in *Human Dignity: Social Autonomy and the Critique of Capitalism*, edited by Werner Bonefeld & Kosmas Psychopedis (Aldershot: Ashgate).
- Reichelt, Helmut (2004) 'Social Reality as Appearance: Some Notes on Marx's Conception of Reality', in *Human Dignity: Social Autonomy and the Critique of Capitalism*, edited by Werner Bonefeld & Kosmas Psychopedis (Aldershot: Ashgate).
- Rubin, Isaak Illich (1990/1928) *Essays on Marx's Theory of Value*, translated by Milos Samardzija & Fredy Perlman (Montréal-New York: Black Rose Books).
- Shields, Rob (1999) *Lefebvre, Love and Struggle: Spatial Dialectics* (London: Routledge).
- Soja, Edward W. (1996) *Thirdspace: Journeys to Los Angeles and Other Real-and-Imagined Places* (Oxford: Blackwell).
- Veneigem, Raoul (1981/1969) 'Notice to the Civilised Concerning Generalised Self-Management', in *Situationist International: Anthology*, edited and translated by Ken Knabb (Berkeley: Bureau of Public Secrets).