Chloë Fitzgerald
Thesis
Moral intuitions: what are they and how should we use them?
Supervisors
Professor Peter Goldie (Philosophy), Jonathan Quong (Politics)
Email:
Research
Ethics, emotions, moral psychology, philosophy of mind.
Conference Papers
- March 2010 ‘How is moral intuition linked to emotion?’ Presented at ‘Ethics and Emotions’, Universidad de Salamanca. I argue that moral intuitions should not be confused with emotions; they are different types of mental phenomena. Moral intuitions are similar phenomenologically to the ‘feeling of knowing’, such as when something is on the tip of one’s tongue. They can be interwoven with occurrent emotions and with emotional dispositions, but are a distinct phenomenon. Their connection to emotion does not necessarily harm nor enhance them.
- September 2009 ‘Could the social sciences help make evolutionary game theory useful for industry and policy-makers?’ (Co-authored with Christine Clavien, University of Lausanne). Presented jointly at ‘Evolution, Co-operation and Rationality’, University of Bristol. We explore the possibility of using data from the social sciences to make evolutionary game theory more psychologically realistic and predictive of behaviour in specific contexts.
- May 2009 ‘Intuition: belief or emotion?’ Presented at ‘Emotion, Value and Desire’ workshop, University of Manchester. I propose a model of intuition according to which it is not to be identified as a mental type with belief or emotion, but is rather the prompting that precedes judgements. A consequence of the view is that moral intuitions are neither to be revered nor dismissed, but evaluated according to the status of the underlying dispositions that generate them. November 2008 ‘The relevance of empirical research to meta-ethics’. Presented at the University of Manchester departmental research seminar. I argue that empirical research is of little use in settling longstanding meta-ethical debates, but that it can be useful in reframing the way in which these debates are conceptualised.
- September 2008 ‘Thick concepts and their role in moral psychology’ (Co-authored with my supervisor, Peter Goldie). I presented it on behalf of both at the interdisciplinary workshop, ‘Emotions, imagination and moral reasoning’, Macquarie Centre for Cognitive Science, Sydney. The paper argues that thick concepts are pervasive in our everyday moral thinking and strongly commends their use by all researchers in moral psychology. Forthcoming in a publication of the proceedings that will form part of the Macquarie Monographs in Cognitive Science series.
- April 2008 ‘Emotional conflict and social context’ Presented at ‘Emotions and Intentionality’, Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic, Prague. The paper is an attempt to advance the debate in philosophy of emotion concerning conflicts between emotion and judgement. I argue that the debate should be looked at from a new angle, taking into consideration the social context in which an individual’s conflicts occur. Published in a special issue of the journal Organon F.
- November 2007 ‘Moral or conventional motivation?’ Presented at ‘Emotions and moral motivation’ workshop, University of Manchester, which I co-organised with Peter Goldie and fellow PhD student, Gayle Impey. I argue that behind the moral/conventional distinction employed in psychology lies a search for a special ‘moral’ motivation and that this search should be abandoned.
- August 2007 ‘Is moral realism consistent with evolution?’ (Co-authored with Christine Clavien) Presented jointly at the annual conference of the ‘International Society for the History, Philosophy and Social Science of Biology’, University of Exeter and a revised version at ‘Darwin's Reach: Celebrating Darwin's Legacy Across the Disciplines’, HOFSTRA Cultural Center, New York, March 2009. We argue that someone who takes an evolutionary approach to ethics cannot consistently be a moral realist. Currently under review with a journal.
Teaching
I have been a teaching assistant on the following:
Second year philosophy modules: Ethics, Philosophy of Religion and Phenomenology
First year philosophy module: Mind and Language
Additional Information
My current research is funded by a biomedical ethics studentship from the Wellcome Trust. I originally came to Manchester in September 2006 to do an MRes in Philosophy, for which I was funded by the AHRC. I was attracted to the Philosophy department at Manchester because I was keen to pursue research into emotions and Professor Peter Goldie, an expert in this field, had recently taken up the Samuel Hall Chair of Philosophy here.
I am currently a referee for Manchester’s postgraduate online philosophy journal, Praxis. I helped organise the annual Manchester postgraduate conference, Open Minds, in June 2008.
I am keen on interdisciplinary research projects and like to be involved in collaboration between philosophy, psychology, anthropology, economics, politics, education, law and other disciplines.