Phil Brown
Thesis
Should we treat morality as a fiction?
Supervisors
David Liggins and Michael Scott
Research
The question I explore in my thesis is, what should one do with moral discourse if one is an error theorist about morality? Error theory is the thesis that all statements that ascribe a moral property to an object (such as a person or an action) are untrue, because moral properties do not exist. Some people think that if such statements are uniformly untrue, we should just give up speaking in moral terms. However, it is not obvious that this is either psychologically possible or particularly desirable. Another option which has been recently discussed is moral fictionalism. The fictionalist argues that morality has many benefits that make it worth retaining. For instance, there are some actions which we may be often tempted to do, even though we know we are likely to regret them. Thinking of them as absolutely forbidden may be more helpful in avoiding doing them rather than thinking of them as just generally a bad idea. Fictionalists argue that error theorists can retain the benefits of morality by adjusting their attitudes to the moral judgements we are inclined to endorse. Rather than believing them, we should just pretend that they are true. However, I argue that if morality is to be positively motivational, it has to be believed and thus moral fictionalism will not work. My own view is that the error theorist can continue to enjoy the benefits of moral thought by continuing to have moral beliefs. This entails that the error theorist both believes and disbelieves the error theory. However, so long as the these beliefs are not tokened simultaneously, the error theorist avoids believing any contradictions, although she will have contradictory beliefs. I think that's a price worth paying.
Teaching Experience
Crtical Thinking
Knowledge and Reality
Twentieth Century Analytic Philosophy
Introduction to Logic
Ethics.